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E. THE MECHANICS OF SECTION 820
WITH the above discussion of the theory underlying Section 820"0 as
a background, we may proceed to a consideration of the mechanics of
the section. The exposition will be intricate, because the Congressional
device with which it deals is an elaborate one. This elaboration is in-
tended to forestall any abuse of equitable possibilities which Congress
has for the first time presented to taxpayers and the Treasury. It was
obviously anticipated that Section 820 would by its very completeness
discourage the kind of juggling which had become so unpleasant a
feature of income tax administration where doubtful timing or prt*-
prietorship of income was encountered. Obviously the legislators realized
that the section would be a liability rather than an asset if it were so
frequently invoked as to increase the bulk of litigated controversies.
Hence the reader should at all times consider the details of this legisla-
tion in the light of safeguards against and discouragements to litigation.
The basic conditions to the operation of the section are: (1) The
case must fall within one of the categories specified in subsection (b);
(2) there must be a "determination under the income tax laws" within
the meaning of subsection (a) (1) ; (3) correction of the "error" by
means of the normal procedure must be prevented; (4) an inconsistent
position must have been asserted in the manner described in subsection
(b) ; (5) the amount of the adjustment must be computed in accordance
with subsection (d) ; (6) the adjustment must be made in the manner
prescribed in subsections (c) and (e) and be with respect to a taxable
year beginning on or after January 1, 1932."° Consideration of the
* The first portion of this article appeared in the February issue (1939) 48 YALE
L. J. 509.
fProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
*Assistant Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Department.
,*Professor of Law, University of California School of Jurisprudence.
49. The full text of § 820 is quoted in an Appendix, at p. 776. This section is now
§ 3801 of the INMTERAL REVENuE CODE. As this article was written prior to the adoption
of the Code, no attempt has been made to alter the statutory references.
50. Subsection (f) imposes this requirement. No reasons are advanced in the Com-
mittee Reports for so limiting the operation of § 820. Apparently, it was thought inad-
visable to allow the successful maintenance of a position inconsistent with the result
reached in a previous year to produce an adjustment if the latter year were too far in
the past, perhaps because the returns and other pertinent documents may have bn
lost, etc. The year 1932 was arbitrarily chosen as the dividing line. Since a party by
refusing to take an inconsistent position, however, can prevent an adjustment for a
closed year, the taxpayer, or the Commissioner, would thus be delving into the past only
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initial condition-the types of cases in which relief is provided-is post-
poned to a later point; the other conditions will first be considered in
detail.
1. Determination under the Income Tax Laws.
Section 820 is designed to offer relief where the tax results of an
earlier year and a later year combine to present an inequitable burden or
avoidance in the manner described in subsection (b). It would be im-
possible to ascertain whether the prescribed inequity exists until the tax
result* for the later year has become final, for an inequity resulting from
a decision in a prior stage of consideration with respect to the tax for
the later year may disappear upon final action. Consequently, Section
820 does not become operative until there has been a final determination
with respect to the later year. Three types of such a determination are
recognized in subsection (a) (1) defining the term "determination under
the income tax laws",-a final court or Board of Tax Appeals decision,
a closing agreement, and a final disposition by the Commissioner of
a claim for refund. The designation of judicial action as providing the
requisite determination requires no comment, except to note that in each
particular case it is necessary to ascertain whether the decision, judg-
ment, decree, or order has become final." The remaining two "deter-
minations" relate to administrative action and their limited number is
an interesting commentary on the extent to which finality is delayed
under present tax procedure. 2 Thus, the assertion of a deficiency in
a 90-day letter does not mark a final step, as the taxpayer may appeal
to the Board of Tax Appeals; even payment of the deficiency does not
end the controversy, as a claim for refund may be filed within two years.
because he chose to do so by taking an inconsistent position, and consequently would not
be in a position to protest against the inconveniences resulting from lapse of time, While
the party claiming the adjustment might suffer on account of difficulties of proof, at
least he is given an opportunity under § 820 to recover the amount of the adjustment
where it can be established, whereas under the prior law no such opportunity was afforded,
For these reasons the limitation of subsection (f) is inadvisable.
51. As the Regulations under this section indicate [Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D.
4856, Art. 820(a)-2], the date upon which a Board of Tax Appeals decision becomes
final is prescribed in § 1005, REVExuE Act or 1926, as amended. Since a variety of
statutory provisions and court rules affect the question as to when a court decision be-
comes final, the Regulations merely state that while the date must in each case be deter-
mined upon the particular facts, ordinarily a decision of a lower court becomes final upon
the expiration of the time for taking an appeal. Section 407(a), RT vNv,1: Acr or 1938,
in providing for a deficiency dividend credit, similarly rests upon a final Board decishon,
a final judgment in a suit to which the United States is a party, or a closing agreement
to establish the deficiency. Under both § 820 and § 407(a), a final Board decision entered
upon stipulation after settlement of the proceeding without the necessity of a hearing by
the Board would satisfy the requirement of a final determination.
52. Cf. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure For Federal Income, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-a Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1393.
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Consequently, neither the issuance of a notice of deficiency nor payment
of tax is accepted by Section 820 as a final determination. The disposi-
tion by the Commissioner of a claim for refund, however, if acquiesced
in by the taxpayer as respects the items as to which the disposition is
unfavorable to him, is considered final action. As the taxpayer's acquies-
cence must be evidenced by his failure to bring suit within the time
allowed for instituting suit with respect to a denial of a refund claim,
further action with respect to the tax liability is largely impossible and
a definitive decision exists. Where the disposition with respect to an
item favors the taxpayer, no waiting period is required and such dis-
position becomes final for the purposes of Section 820 upon the date of
allowance of refund or credit, 3 or upon the date of mailing notice of
disallowance if the allowed items have been offset by other items advanced
by the Commissioner. In accepting such a disposition as a final deter-
mination, the section disregards the right of the Commissioner to upset
the determination by a successful suit for erroneous refund. " Two rea-
sons for such disregard may be advanced-the relative infrequency of
suits for erroneous refund, and the fact that in the rare case where the
determination is upset, the correct result may be reached under Section
820 through a second adjustment. 55
The complexity of the language designating the time when a disposi-
tion of a claim for refund becomes final results from the necessity of
covering both the items with respect to which the taxpayer is seeking
refund, as to which his contentions (the statutory term is "clain") may
be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part, and the items which the Com-
missioner is applying, either in partial or full reduction of those claims
of the taxpayer which are allowed, or even to establish a deficiencv. °
The statutory language utilized to solve this problem is based upon what
53. The date on which the schedule of overassessments is signed by the Commissioner
is the date of allowance of refund or credit. Cf. § 1104, REVEN.UE- Acr oF 1932; McEachern
v. Rose, 302 U. S. 56 (1937); United States v. Wurts, 303 U. S. 414 (1938).
54. § 610, REVENUE AcT OF 1928.
55. Thus, suppose the taxpayer failed to include an item of income in his return
for 1935. He included the item in his return for 1936, but after the expiration of the
period of limitations on assessments for 1935, filed a refund claim for 1936. The claim
is allowed, and the Commissioner secures an adjustment for 1935, under subsection
(b) (3). The Commissioner then files suit for erroneous refund with respect to the
refund for 1936 and recovers such refund, as the item of income properly belongs in gross
income for 1936. The taxpayer may then secure an adjustment for 1935, under subsec-
tion (b) (1), as an item of income has been included tvice, once erroneously by reason
of the previous adjustment under § 820 and a second time by reason of the court decision
with respect to 1936. It may be observed that § 407(a) chose the other alternative and
did not consider a disposition of a claim for refund as a final determination. See note
51, supra.56. The Regulations under this section expressly provide for the varying combina-
tions which may occur. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-3.
1939]
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may be termed the "item" aspect of tax liability. Thus, if a taxpayer
files a refund claim for $5,000, this section requires a breakdown of
that claim into the various "items" making up the total claim, e.g., a
deduction for interest not claimed in the return, exclusion of dividend
income erroneously included in the return, a credit for dependents not
claimed in the return, etc. Each item, and the contention made with
respect to it, is considered a separate matter for the purpose of this
section, so that wfiile the fate of the refund claim as a whole may be
significant in ascertaining the time when the disposition of the conten-
tion with respect to an item becomes final, the section concerns itself
primarily with that disposition. As a consequence, several determinations
whose times of finality differ may result from action on a single refund
claim. If the contention as to deduction for interest be allowed and the
contentions as to the exclusion of dividend income and the credit for
dependents disallowed, either in whole or in part, 7 the former disposition
becomes final on the date of allowance of refund or credit, while the
latter disposition becomes final on the expiration of the time allowed
the taxpayer for instituting suit. If the refund claim as a whole had
been disallowed by reason of offsetting items applied by the Commissioner,
as the failure to include rental income in the return, the disposition as
to the allowed deduction for interest would become final upon the (late
of mailing notice of disallowance of the claim for refund; the disposi-
tion as to the remaining two contentions would become final, as in the
previous situation, on the expiration of the time allowed the taxpayer
for instituting suit; the disposition as to the rental income would similarly
become final at that time, unless such offsetting item resulted in a defi-
ciency, in which case its finality would depend upon its future courseY.
57. See Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-3(b)(iii), indicating
that any difference in the extent of the deduction or in the computation of the over-
payment which produces an amount less than the taxpayer's claim with respect to the
deduction constitutes a disallowance.
58. The phrase "items applied by the Commissioner in reduction of the refund or
credit," used in subsection (a) (1) (C) (ii), covers a reduction of the amount of the
claims allowed down to and including zero, but does not extend to items whoe applica-
tion produces a minus result and consequently a deficiency. In the latter case, the defi-
ciency is treated as is any other deficiency, i.e., it may eventuate in a determination by
way of court or Board decision, closing agreement, or even disposition of claim for
refund (where the deficiency is later paid and another claim for refund filed), depending
upon the subsequent action with respect to such deficiency. Regulations 101, Appcndix,
T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-3(c), in stating that such subsequent action may result in a
determination under subsection (a) (1) (A) or (B) fail to account for the last possibility
mentioned above. The disposition as to the item, with respect to which the claim waq
allowed but the amount thereof was reduced by the offsetting items, is affected only as to
the date of its finality by the question whether the offset produces a deficiency-if
some refund or credit is allowed, the date is the date of allowance of refund or credit.
If none is allowed, the date is the date of mailing notice of disallowance. See SrAT :trNT'
OF THE HOUSE iiANAGERS, H. R. REP. No. 2330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 57.
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The other type of administrative action designated as a determination
for the purposes of this section, a closing agreement,'" permits the parties
at any time to dispense with the necessity of running the gamut of ad-
ministrative procedure through to a disposition of a claim for refund,
or of resorting to final judicial action, in order to obtain a determination.
A tax-payer who desires to acquiesce in a deficiency letter and pay the
tax need not, in order to secure a determination, pay such tax and then
file a refund claim, or refuse to pay the tax and obtain a Board decision,
but may telescope the entire procedure by entering into a closing agree-
ment. Similarly, after a claim for refund has been denied, the necessity
of waiting for the expiration of the two-year period provided in Section
3226 may be avoided by a closing agreement."0 Inasmuch as the party
desiring a closing agreement is in effect offering to concede the issue
with respect to the later year in order to secure an adjustment under
Section 820 with respect to an earlier year, and as he could in any event
force the issue for the later year eventually to a conclusion in the form
of one or the other of the specified determinations,"' it is to be expected
59. § 606, REv x-q AcT OF 1928, as amended. A closing agreement becomes final on
the date of its approval by the Secretary, Under Secretary, or an Assistant Secretary.
60. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-1, state that a closing agree-
ment may be used if "it becomes necessary or desirable to effect a determination in order
to obtain or accelerate an adjustment authorized by section K20," and (Art. 820(a)-3),
points out that the two-year waiting period provided in § 3226 may he avoided by the
use of a closing agreement. A Commissioner's Mimeograph with respect to closing agree-
ments, No. 4821, August 19, 1938, states that "a closing agreement should be executed
and submitted for approval whenever such action is deemed appropriate under the pro-
visions of section 407 or section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938." Cf. Regulations 101,
Appendix T. D. 4855.
It has been contended [see note 98, ifra] that § 820 is an open invitation to litigation
as the taxpayer, in order to be in a position to obtain an adjustment, must litigate to a
finish the controversy for the open year. This criticism plainly overloo!:s the speci-
fication of a dosing agreement as a determination, and the fact that through such agree-
ment the parties may avoid all litigation for the open year.
61. Thus, if the taxpayer erroneously includes an item in gross income for 1935 and,
after the expiration of the period of limitations for refund claims for 1935, the Commis-
sioner asserts a deficiency because of the failure to include the item in gross income for
1938, the taxpayer in requesting a closing agreement for 1938 on the basis of the inclu-
sion of the item in gross income is thus conceding the deficiency. If the Commissioner, in
order to prevent an adjustment under § 820, refuses the closing agreement, the taxpayer
can refuse to pay the deficiency, and litigate the issue in the Board, or pay the deficiency
and file a refund claim, obtaining a determination in either event. As a dosing agree-
ment need not relate to the total tax liability for a particular year but may concern itself
with one or more separate items affecting that tax liability (Form 906), the dosing agree-
ment for the purposes of § 820 need not be impeded by the desire of either part), to avoid
entering into a closing agreement with respect to the total tax liability. Cf. Regulations
101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-i; Commissioner's Mimeograph 'No. 482, Aug-
ust 19, 1938.
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that closing agreements for the purpose of the section will be employed
frequently.
2
2. Prevention of the Correction of the Error.
An adjustment under Section 820 is authorized only if correction (f
the effect of the error under normal procedure is impossible on the date the
determination becomes final, 3 so that if correction may be accomplished
under other sections of the internal revenue laws, Section 820 is inopera-
tive. Section 820, accordingly, does not prescribe an exclusive method
for correcting errors.0 4  For example, if an interest deduction were
erroneously allowed for 1934 and again taken for 1936, and at the
time the determination authorizing the allowance for 1936 became filial,
the period of limitations with respect to assessments for 1934 had not
expired, Section 820 would not be applicable inasmuch as the Coniimis-
sioner could correct the error by asserting a deficiency for 1934."'
62. Under Secretary Magill, in approving the Regulations under § 820, stated that
"closing agreements would be entered into wherever necessary to effect an adjustment
under the section." Treasury Press Release No. 14-38, 383 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax
Serv. 1f 6502. This announcement, together with the statements quoted in note 60 supra,
should allay taxpayers' fears, based on prior experience with closing agreements, that
such agreements will not be forthcoming from the Bureau for the purposes of § 820.
The necessity, from the taxpayer's side, for assurance that such agreements will be
entered into derives in part from the Bureau practice of closing settlements by a special
form 870 waiver, under which the taxpayer, in addition to waiving his right to petition
to the Board, also waives his right to file a refund claim. See Baldwin v. Higgin., 383
C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 16093 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). Such a ,,pecialized waiver
would prevent the taxpayer from obtaining a determination through either route, so that
a determination by way of closing agreement is his only method of securing an adjustment
under § 820. The Commissioner's Mimeograph, referred to in note 60 supra, indicates
that a form 906 closing agreement may be used along with the waiver in these cases.
63. The terminology in subsection (b), "on the date the determination becomes
final," was not well chosen, inasmuch as "determination" in subsection (a) (1) is de-
fined in terms of a final determination: e.g., a decision "which has become filial," a "fiial
disposition" of a claim for refund, a closing agreement (as § 606 of the RMvNUE AcT oF
1928, as amended, provides that if an agreement is approved, such agreement shall be
final and subsection (a) (1) in effect refers to an approved agreement). Consequently,
when the action forming the basis for the determination becomes final, a determination
results, so that it is tautologous to say that a determination becomes final. In a later
part of subsection (b), the phrase "time of the determination," and in subsection (c),
the phrase "date of the determination," are used to connote the same point of time as the
phrase "on the date the determination becomes final"; Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D.
4856, Art. 820(b)-0, use the phrase "date of the determination." Moreover, the phrase-
ology in subsection (a) (1), "The term 'determination under the income tax laws' means,"
is also not well chosen as that phrase appears only at the beginning of subsection (b),
whereas elsewhere only the word "determination" is used. The term "determination"
alone should have been defined in subsection (a) (1). The Regulations throughout use
only the word "determination."
64. See Report of the Senate Committee on Finance. SEx. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 49; Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0.
65. In the example in the text, if the period of limitations with respect to deficiency
assessments for 1934 had expired, but the taxpayer had obtained the deduction for 1934
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Section 820 is not confined to statute of limitations cases, although
they will undoubtedly form the largest group of cases in which it will
be involved." Although the period of limitations may not have expired
with respect to the earlier year, the taxpayer and the Commissioner may
have entered into a closing agreement with respect to the tax liability
for that year, which agreement, under Section 606 of the Revenue Act
of 1928, as amended, would prevent correction of any error for that
year." Section 820 thus adts the successful maintenance of an incon-
sistent position to the fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a
material fact which render vulnerable a closing agreement. While at
first thought such an inroad upon the finality of closing agreements may
seem undesirable, it will be recognized that a party seeking shelter behind
a closing agreement for the earlier year at the time he asserts an in-
consistent position in the later year is in reality making use of that agree-
ment in a manner no different from the conduct thought undesirable
where the statute of limitations is the protective shield. The finality which
by way of refund and such refund at the time the determination became final could be
recovered by a suit for erroneous refund, § 820 would not be operative; while one methcl
of correcting the error is prevented, another avenue is open and correction of the effect
of the error is therefore not prevented. This argument stresses the word "prevented" in
the phrase "correction of the effect of the error is prevented by the operation . . . of
any provision of the internal-revenue laws" and assumes that the word "any" was used
merely to indicate that not all of the provisions barring correction had to be operative, i.e.,
both the expiration of the statute of limitations and a closing agreement were not re-
quired, if the operation of one alone resulted in the closing of all methods of correction.
66. Cf. the examples given in the Report of the Senate Committee ons Fiancec, mupra
note 64, at 50; STATEMENT OF THE HousE MANAGMRS, op. Cit. supra note 58, at 56, and
Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0.
67. Section 606 of the REVENUE AcT OF 1928 in its original as well as its amended
form expressly provides for the finality of closing agreements; endowed vth this qual-
ity, such agreements constitute by virtue of the internal revenue laws a bar to the cor-
rection of errors. It is specious to regard the bar as arising simultaneously from the
principles of the law of contracts and to argue accordingly that § 820 removes only the
bar of the statute but not that of contract law. The binding effect of a closing agreement
arises from the authority granted under § 606. The particularity xvith which that section
defines the formalities, scope and effect of closing agreements is clear evidence that it
contains within itself the complete law governing such agreements. In any event the
reports of the Congressional Committees [see Report of the Senate Committee on Finance,
supra note 64, at 56] leave no room for doubting that Congress intended that adjustments
should be made under § 820 in these cases and that it considered tie bar of a closing
agreement as arising from the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws.
Where an adjustment would operate to the detriment of the taxpayer and the barrier
to correction of the error is a closing agreement executed prior to the effective date of
§ 820, it may be argued that the binding force of the agreement cannot he impaired with-
out violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Choate v. Trapp,
224 U. S. 665 (1911). Only by virtue of the taxpayer's own inconsistent conduct would
the closing agreement be affected by § 820, which seeks to hold the parties to the positions
taken and prohibits an inequitable use of the agreement. Certainly that section lacks the
unreasonable, arbitrary and whimsical characteristics that usually must be present to find
an act of Congress in violation of due process.
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the closing agreement sought with respect to the treatment of the items
making up the tax liability has not resulted; as one party has in effect
departed from the agreement by again utilizing one of the items to obtain
a tax advantage in a later year, the other party is entitled to avail himself
of such departure to correct the error." Sections 607, 608, and 60() of
Revenue Act of 1928, relating to payments, refunds or credits after the
period of limitation has expired, likewise constitute obstructions to the
correction of errors. 9
Sections 272(f) and 322(c) of the Revenue Act of 1938, and cor-
responding provisions of the earlier Revenue Acts, prohibit deficiency
letters or credits or refunds after the taxpayer has duly filed a petition with
the Board of Tax Appeals. Here again provisions of the internal revenue
laws prevent the correction of errors. In the cases in which such sections
would apply, the doctrine of res judicata,7 ° including the doctrine with
respect to split causes of action, may also operate as a bar to correction.
Under these circumstances there may be uncertainty as to whether or not
an adjustment could be made under Section 820. Because of its bearing
upon the operation of Sections 272(f) and 322(c) and because it may
constitute the only bar to the correction of errors that does not arise
from the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws, res judicata
must be considered in some detail in its relation to Section 820.
Where the same right or fact is placed in issue and directly adjudicated
and is again at issue between the same parties or their privies in a sub-
sequent suit, it is well established 7' that the first determination concerning
68. See Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 49.
69. These provisions were recently applied by the Supreme Court in MeEachern v.
Rose, 302 U. S. 56 (1937). The decedent had sold stocks and elected to return the profit
on the installment basis. After his death in 1928, his administrator erroneously reported
annually a profit on each yearly payment and then brought suit for overpayments of in-
come tax for 1929, 1930, and 1931. Under § 44(d), REvENUE ACT oF 1928, the capital
gain included in the value of the unpaid installments was income taxable to the decedent
for 1928. While collection of the unpaid tax for 1928 was barred, as it exceeded the
sum of the overpayments for 1929, 1930, and 1931 the collector contended that the admin-
istrator could not recover. The Court held that, while equitable principles might preclude
recovery in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, §§ 607 and 609(a), RLv-
ENUE ACT OF 1928, made void a credit against a barred liability, and consequently the
overpayments could not be credited against the unpaid 1928 tax. See discussion of this
case in Traynor, Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1937 Term (1938) 33 ILL. L.
REv. 371; Comment (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 496. Section 820 would authorize adjust-
ment under these circumstances, assuming that it could be said that the relationship of
decedent and decedent's estate existed with respect to the year as to which the error was
made. See note 186, infra.
70. See the excellent discussions of this subject in Griswold, Res udicala in Federal
Tax Cases (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1320 and PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TARA-
TION (2d Series 1938) 104 et seq.
71. See Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 300 et seq.,
Griswold, supra note 70, at 1327, 1333-4.
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that right or fact is conclusive upon the parties and their privies with
respect to the same or a different taxable year. - The doctrine of res
judicata does not stop there but goes on to embrace the rule against
splitting causes of action. If the right or fact involved in the subse-
quent suit might have been put in issue to sustain the claim or demand
involved in the previous suit, the previous judgment concludes the parties
and their privies as to this fact or right as well as to those which actually
were put in issue. In a federal income tax case the cause of action is
ordinarily the tax liability of the taxpayer for a particular year; matters
which are or might be put in issue to sustain or defeat that action must
be presented at that time for consideration for they cannot be raised
again in a subsequent action relating to the same year.7" "Whether the
second suit involves an income tax on the same year's income, or an
estate tax on the same estate, the courts quite consistently hold that a
cause of action cannot be split up and litigated in separate parts."74
It should be observed at the outset that res judicata may prevent the
successful maintenance of an inconsistent position-the sine qua non
of an adjustment under Section 820. If, for example, the inclusion of
an item of income in a particular year were governed by res judicata
because it had already been in issue and adjudicated, the defense of res
judicata, if established, would prevent its inclusion in a later year and
there would be no occasion for Section 820 to operate.- If, however,
res judicata were not relied upon, even though it might well have been,-,
72. For example, the taxpayer received a dividend, and there was a controversy as
to whether he received it in 1932 or 1933. The Commissioner won either a Board of Tax
Appeals or court decision holding that it was received in 1932. After the judgment has
become final the Commissioner attempts to include the dividend in gross income for
1933, the correct year, using the deficiency machinery for this purpose. Res judicata will
block this move.
73. For example, the taxpayer received in 1932 a stock dividend of common on
preferred in the sum of $10,000. He returned the dividend as taxable income for 1932.
Later he sought a refund because he had included in his gross income for 1932 com-
pensation paid him by a State for special legal services. He wins this refund by a district
court judgment but does not raise, at any time in the progress of the case, the overpay-
ment resulting fromthe inclusion of the stock dividend. Res judicata vill ar subsequent
recovery on a suit for that overpavment as the judgment in the suit on the compensation
adjudicated the tax liability for 1932.
74. Griswold. supra note 70, at 1328-9.
75. Thus, in the example in note 72 supra. while there is a determination vith respect
to the year 1933;that determination, as a consequence of res judicata, prevents the inclu-
sion of an item previously included for 1932, and the case therefore does not fall within
subsection (b) (1). , -
76. "Very little attention has been paid to the question whether a prior judgment
claimed to he conclusive must be pleaded, offered in evidence; or vhether it may bz the
subjeft of judicial notice: One court has determined that it will take judicial notice of its
own records for the purpose of res judicata [Bowe-Burke Mining Co. v. Willcuts, 45 F.
(2d) 394 (D. Minn. 1930)] and the Board has taken judicial notice of a prior decisiin
'under the circumstances' [Woodley Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 253
19391
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and a determination were obtained under which the item was again in-
cluded in gross income, res judicata would then present a serious obstacle
to the effective operation of Section 820. If the determination were ob-
tained by way of a closing agreement or final disposition of a claim for
refund (as distinguished from judicial action), it could not be established,
in view of the decision, that the item was erroneously treated in the
earlier year. If the determination again including the item were obtained
by way of a final decision of the Board of Tax Appeals or of a court
of competent jurisdiction, this second decision would control if the
question again arose"* and would establish that the item was erroneously
,treated in the earlier year, but it would not impeach the earlier judgment
insofar as the purpose of the proceeding in which the prior judgment was
rendered is concerned, 7 i.e., the determinatian of tax liability for the
year with respect to which it was rendered. That liability being fixed
by res judicata, correction of the error would be prevented and an adjust-
ment would be made under Section 820 if such prevention arises from
the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws, a problem sub-
sequently considered.
Res judicata'in its aspect of forbidding the splitting of a cause of
action cannot prevent the successful maintenance of an inconsistent posi-
tion. 79 The year with respect to which the determination may be sought
is a different year from that of the previous adjudication, so that a
different cause of action is involved. The split cause of action rule be-
comes applicable, however, after the determination with respect to an
item in a later year, whenever an effort is made to correct the erroneous
treatment of that item for the year affected by the previous adjudication
with respect to other matters for that year."0 As the previous judgment
(1929) ]. The Supreme Court has recently passed over the question of the exact form and
time in which res judicata must be presented. [Blair v. Commissioner, 57 Sup. Ct. 330,
331-32 (U. S. 1937)]." Griswold, supra note 70, at 1339.
77. Donald v. J. J. White Lumber Company, 68 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934)
and cases cited therein at page 442.
78. See FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 1327, § 629. The opposing contention
is that the second decision has become the controlling judgment, completely displacing the
first decision and therefore wiping out altogether the possibility of claiming res judlcata
on the basis of that decision.
79. Thus, in the example in note 73 supra, suppose that the taxpayer in 1938 sold
the dividend stock and claimed $10,000 as its basis. As a different cause of action is
involved, the tax liability for 1938, and as the treatment of the stock dividend was not
in issue in the cause of action with respect to 1932, the taxpayer obviously cannot rely
on res judicata when the Commissioner claims a deficiency for 1938 on the ground the
stock had a zero basis.
80. Thus, in the example in note 79 supra, after the determination that the stock has
a zero basis, indicating thereby the erroneous treatment of the dividend upon receipt in
1932, the fact that the suit on the compensation adjudicated the taxpayer's liability for
1932 would bar correction of such error.
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could not be affected by the determination, 8' even where the latter is in
the form of a court or Board decision, the former would prevent any
further adjudication with respect to the tax liability of the previous year
and consequently would bar correction of the error. The problem is
therefore squarely presented, in any attempt to secure an adjustment
under Section 820, whether the barrier to correction of the error thus
created by res judicata arises from the operation of a provision of the
internal revenue laws.
In the case of court decisions equally plausible arguments may lie
advanced for the proposition that res judicata arises independently of
any provision of the internal revenue laws and for the proposition that
it arises from the operation of such laws. In support of the former it
may be urged that res judicata is a doctrine inherent in the judicial
process owing neither its origin, scope nor force to any provision of
the internal revenue laws. In support of the latter it may be urged that
the judicial process with respect to internal revenue taxes is very closely
linked with provisions of the internal revenue laws and that court de-
cisions are rendered in income tax cases pursuant to the authorization
and limitations prescribed in such provisions.82 "Yhile they do not ex-
81. See FREMAX, 10c. cit. supra note 78. 0
82. The Tucker Act, 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. §41(20) (1934) grants
authority to sue the United States in the District Courts upon claims founded upon "any
law of Congress," interpreted to authorize suits for the recovery of internal revenue
taxes [Greenport Basin Construction Co. v. United States. 260 U.S. 512 (1923)], and
expressly provides for recovery of sums wrongfully collected "under the internal revenue
laws" even if the claim exceeds $10,000 when the collector is dead or out of office.
Another act gives the right to sue in the Court of Claims [10 STAT. 612 (1855) 28 U. S. C.
§250(1) (1934)] upon claims founded upon any law of Congress, interpreted to author-
ize suits for claims which may arise under the internal revenue laws. United States v.
Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 728 (1881). While suits against collectors for the recovery of
internal revenue taxes are personal [Sage v. United States, 250 U. S. 33 (1919)1 they are
authorized by acts of Congress. See George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S.
373, 380 (1933), and cases there cited. REv. STAT. § 3148 [26 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1934)]
provides that "each collector shall in every respect, be responsible both to the United
States and to individuals, as the case may be, for all monevs collected, and for every
act done or neglected to be done, by any of his deputies while acting as such:' REV.
STAT. §771 [28 U. S. C. §485 (1934)] imposes the duty upon district attorneys to de-
fend suits against collectors for the recovery of internal revenue taxes and REv. STT.
§ 989 [28 U. S. C. § 842 (1934)] authorizes the payment by the United States of a judg-
ment against a collector where there was probable cause for his act or vhere he acted
under the directions of a proper superior officer, and prohibits the issuance of execution
against him in such cases. Even if some of the provisions cited in this note were held not
to be provisions of the internal revenue laws, despite their authorizing or determining
the scope and effect of suits for the recovery of internal revenue taxes, there can be no
doubt that RE-. STAT. § 3148 supra, is a provision of the internal revenue laws. Nor can
there be any doubt that REv. STAT. § 3226, supra, is a provision of the internal revenue
laws, governing all suits for the recovery of internal revenue taxes, including suits
against collectors. Tucker Y. Alexander, 275 U.S. 228 (1927). It should be noted that
the REVExuE Acr oF 1924, § 1014, amending REV. ST.T. § 3226, supra, to provide that pay-
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pressly provide for the doctrine of res judicata, they set in motion the
judicial process with all the trappings of judicial doctrines. When one
of these doctrines is the finality of court decisions rendered pursuant
to a statutory provision, it is difficult to determine where the operation
of the statute ends and that of the doctrine begins. The existence of
the doctrine antedates that of the statutory provision, yet the provision
is necessary to animate the doctrine for the particular situation which
the provision controls. Any provision authorizing judicial determinations
inevitably operates to bring into action judicial doctrines involved in
that procedure. Section 820 authorizes an adjustment whenever cor-
rection would otherwise be prevented not simply by the express language
of any provision of the internal revenue laws but by its "operation,"
Hence it could plausibly apply when the correction is barred by res
judicata8 3
New considerations arise when correction of an error is prevented by
the conclusive effect of a Board of Tax Appeals decision. Whatever
the rule may be with respect to decisions of the courts, which are part
of the judicial structure and have internal revenue tax cases within
the ambit of their general jurisdiction, the Board of Tax Appeals is
an integral part of the internal revenue tax structure designed exclusively
for the consideration of internal revenue taxes. It seems well established
that a decision of the Board under the Revenue Act of 1924 is not
res judicata in subsequent controversies. s4 It seems equally settled that
decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals under the Revenue Act of 1926
and subsequent Acts are conclusive, both as to a later case involving the
same tax year and as to a later case involving the same issues arising
in a different tax year."' The basis for the change after 1926 is found
ment under protest or duress is not necessary for maintenance of such suits, validates
such suits where payment was not made under protest. See 5 PAUL A D MEuTENs, oP.
cit. supra note 7, § 51.47; Winant v. Gardner, 29 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). Thus,
where payment was not so made, the suit, whether against the collector or the United
States, depends upon the operation of a provision of the internal revenue laws,
83. Usually where there is a court decision with respect to the year as to which the
error was made the period of limitations will have expired with respect to refunds or
deficiencies for such year. In such cases there will be a provision of the internal revenue
laws, operating independently of res judicata, to prevent correction of errors. Section 820
directs that "the effect of the error shall be corrected" by an adjustment under that sec-
tion if, "on the date the determination becomes final, correction of the effect of the error
is prevented by the operation of 'any provision of the internal revenue laws' . . . " and
contains no yielding proviso as to other bars that may prevent correction of errors. It
is arguable that, under the literal wording of the section, the existence of a provision
of the internal revenue laws operating as a bar suffices and makes operative the mandate
of § 820 that the error "shall be corrected," overriding ipso facto res judicata as well as
any other impediment. See, however, the interpretation of this phrase discussed in note
65, supra.
84. See Griswold, supra note 70, at 1323, and cases cited therein at notes 20, 21 and 23,
85. See Griswold, supra note 70, at 1325, and cases cited therein at notes 30, 31,
32 and 33.
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in the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926 enlarging the jurisdiction of
the Board. Since 1926 "the Board of Tax Appeals, while not a court...
has by statute been endowed with capacity to render decisions final and
binding on both Commissioner and taxpayer unless reversed on appeal." '
The Board has been so endowed by provisions of the internal revenue
laws. It is believed, therefore, that an adjustment must be made under
Section 820 when correction of errors is prevented by the operation of
Sections 272(f) and 322(c). These sections provide expressly for the
split cause of action rule in the case of Board decisions and seem
definitely designed to occupy the whole field in this respect. Whatever
question there may be as to whether the bar of res judicata in its split
cause of action aspect arises from the operation of provisions of the
internal revenue laws in the case of court decisions, there can be none
here where provisions of the internal revenue laws expressly provide for
the application of that doctrine." Certainly it is evident from the Com-
mittee Reports that Congress intended Section 820 to apply where cor-
rection of errors was prevented by the operation of Sections 272(f)
and 322(c).88 While the application of Section 820 may he clouded by
doubts where res judicata involves a court decision, it would seem to
be beyond question in the case of a Board decision.
If the bar of res judicata can be maintained against the application
of Section 820, therefore, it will be only because of the fortuitous choice
of the tribunal rendering the judgment constituting the bar. The Com-
missioner has no way of controlling which course the taxpayer will fol-
low in initiating litigation. Should the latter elect to conduct the action
in the courts rather than the Board, the Commissioner would be forever
precluded from correcting any errors which might later appear to have
occurred with reference to the year affected by the judgment. A tax-
payer who found himself in doubt about the deductibility of a particular
item claimed in his return might contemplate a later change of position
with regard to this item. Under such circumstances he would find it
greatly to his advantage to conduct any litigation concerning an tin-
related item of the same return in the courts rather than before the
Board so as to preclude the application of Section 820 by the Commis-
sioner in the event of a subsequent change of position.
86. American S. S. Co. v. Wickire Spencer Steel Co., 8 r. Supp. 562, 566 (S. D.
N. Y. 1934).
87. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0, list §§272(i) and 322(c)
as provisions of the internal revenue laws preventing the correction of errors. Art.
820(b)-1, Example 2, and Art. 820(b)-2, Example 2 indicate that adjustments would he
made where §§ 272(f) and 322(c) were applicable.
88. See Report of Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 50; STATFiEr
or THE HouSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 58, at 56. The Senate Cummittee referred
to §§272(f) and 322(c) as the "collateral consequences of a board of tax appeals pro-
ceeding."
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Conversely, situations might arise where the taxpayer would be at a
disadvantage because he could not invoke the application of Section 820
in his particular case. Whenever litigation had been initiated before the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938, the availability of Section 820 to
the taxpayer would depend upon the manner in which that litigation
was conducted. The taxpayer not being able to foresee the result might
unwittingly have precluded himself from obtaining the benefits of Section
820. Even with regard to litigation initiated subsequent to the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1938 he might similarly place himself at a dis-
advantage, because of an unawareness of the effect of res judicata upon
Section 820 or because other considerations controlled the choice of the
tribunal.
Certainly Section 820 did not contemplate anomalous consequences. It
is unlikely therefore that it will receive a judicial interpretation creating
such an eccentric obstruction to the accomplishment of its objectives. All
the reasons for the enactment of Section 820 to supplement "the equitable
principles applied by the courts" by "taking the profit out of inconsistency"
despite the bar of the statute of limitations, of closing agreements and
of the "collateral consequences" of a Board decision apply with full
force to the collateral consequences of court decisions. The doubts on
this matter, however, might well be removed by an amendment to Sec-
tion 820 eliminating "by the operation of any provision of the internal
revenue laws." The section would then clearly require an adjustment
whenever correction of the effect of errors was prevented regardless of
the sources of the prevention. It should be noted that such an amend-
ment would disturb the conclusive force of res judicata where proper
treatment of the item in question had been in issue and adjudicated only,
as pointed out above, in the rare instance of inconsistent Board or court
decisions arising from the failure to rely upon res judicata in the later
proceeding. If a determination other than by court or Board decision
were obtained sanctioning inconsistent conduct, no adjustment could be
made under Section 820 as by its terms an adjustment is possible only
in the event of an earlier erroneous treatment of the item and the adjudi-
cation would conclusively establish that the item had not been previously
erroneously treated.
Section 820 is operative even though the correction of the effect of
the error was prevented prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1938, for subsection (b) refers to the operation of any provision of the
internal revenue laws, "whether before, on, or after the date of enact-
ment of this Act," and is thus in a sense a retroactive section. But al-
though the barrier preventing correction may have existed at the time
of the passage of the Revenue Act of 1938, as where the error was
made with respect to the year 1932 and the period of limitations for
that year had expired prior to 1938, the section is not operative unless
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there is inconsistent conduct after the enactment of the section, so that
the retroactive application of the section is entirely in the control of
the party who is protected by the expiration of the period of limitations.
In this sense the section is prospective in operation,'
As in many instances more than one of the provisions mentioned above
may prevent correction of the error, Section 820 lifts all the barriers,
with the exception of a compromise, to such correction. This is true
even where at the time the determination becomes final only one barrier
is present but thereafter other barriers appear, as where at such time
the expiration of the period of limitations with respect to the earlier year
prevents correction and one week later a final Board decision would also
prevent correction under Section 272(f). If the prerequisite of a barrier
closing all methods of correction at the time the determination becomes
final is satisfied, the mandatory language of the section-"then the effect
of the error shall be corrected by an adjustment made under this section"
-suffices to override other barriers that may spring up to prevent cor-
rection, for otherwise the section would defeat its purpose." The method
of adjustment prescribed by the section, however, permits the prevention
of adjustment by such barriers as may arise from inept conduct in pur-
suing such method, as where the Commissioner fails to mail a deficiency
letter within the time prescribed in subsection (c). Finally, the barrier
of Section 3229 of the Revised Statutes, relating to compromises, is
not lifted by Section 820."'
89. Where the inconsistent position was asserted prior to the enactment of § 82-0, as
the section provided in subsection (a) (1) for a ninety-day waiting period in which either
taxpayer or Commissioner might withdraw from a previously asserted inconsistent posi-
tion, continuation of the proceeding to a final determination which adopts the inconsis-
tent position is thus the equivalent of assertion of such position after the enactment of
§ 820. See STATEMENT OF THE HousE MANAGERS, Op. cit. sitpra note 58, at 58. The
waiting period is provided by excluding from the definition of determination any conduct
otherwise constituting a determination if it became final prior to ninety days after the
date of the enactment of this Act. In interpreting this provision, the Regulations restrict
the section to determinations made on or after August 27, 1938. Regulations 101, Ap-
pendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820-1. Both the section and the Regulations tacitly assume that
a claim for refund could be safely withdrawn by the taxpayer in the ninety-day period
under these circumstances.
90. THE STATEMENT OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS, Op. cit. supra note 58, at 56, states
that the section becomes operative if correction is prevented "by the operation of one
or more provisions of the internal revenue laws." See note 65. supra.
91. Rv. ST.T. § 3229, as amended by § 815, REvENUE AcT oF 1938, permits the com-
promise of any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws. The Com-
missioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, or an Under Secretary
or Assistant Secretary, may effect the compromise prior to the institution of suit; if suit
has been instituted, the compromise may only be effected by the Attorney General. Execu-
tive Order, No. 6166, June 10, 1933, § 5. Section 820 makes no reference to the other
statutory provision for compromises made by the Secretary of the Treasury, REv. STAT.
§ 3469, or to compromises made by the Attorney General under the powers inherent in
his office. It is expected that compromises so effected will also provide a barrier to adjust-
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3. Necessity of Inconsistent Position.
This phase of the subject may best be introduced by an example. Sup-
pose that the taxpayer had erroneously included in his gross income for
1934 an item of interest which increased his tax $500 and that the period
of limitations for refund claims had expired. The taxpayer then volun-
tarily included such item in his gross income for 1938, increasing his
tax, however, by only $100. If the taxpayer were permitted to claim
that an adjustment was authorized because an item of income was in-
cluded in gross income which had been erroneously included in an earlier
year now closed, the statute of limitations on refund claims would be
a nullity in many tax cases. Similarly, if the Commissioner by volun-
tarily allowing a deduction in a year in which it was not claimed by
the taxpayer could thereby obtain an adjustment for an earlier closed
year in which the deduction had been erroneously allowed, the statute
of limitations on assessments would offer little protection to taxpayers.
This danger was recognized by Congress, as the following quotations
from the Report of the Senate Committee on Finance indicate:
"The legislation here proposed is based upon the following principles:
"(1) To preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of
limitations, corrective adjustment should (a) never modify the appli-
cation of the statute except when the party or parties in whose favor
it applies shall have justified such modification by active inconsistency
)92
This problem was met in two ways. As pointed out above, a deter-
mination is prerequisite to the operation of Section 820. In neither of
the examples just presented is a determination present, as a return and
a voluntary refund because of an overpayment are not determinations
under subsection (a) (1), so that an adjustment would not be author-
ized. The definition of determination thus serves to exclude most of
the situations where the remedy afforded by Section 820 is not justified.
As a precaution, the section in addition specifically provides in sub-
section (b) that:
ment. The reason for excluding compromises in § 820 is perhaps the difficulty of computing
the adjustment in such a case. Where the tax liability has been compromised and a
lesser amount accepted, it would be unfair to compute the amount of the adju.tment with-
out regard to such compromise. While it might be provided that if the amount of the
adjustment computed without regard to amounts abated or assessed by reason of compro-
mise represents a decrease in the tax previously determined, such amount shall be reduced
in the ratio that the amount of tax actually paid for such taxable year bears to the tax pre-
viously determined without regard to the compromise, Congress evidently thought that
the small number of compromises did not merit introduction of such complexity into
§ 820. It cannot always be assumed, moreover, that a compromise will be final so as to
prevent correction of an error. Cf. Cloister Printing Corporation v. United States, 100 F.
(2d) 355 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). On the subject of compromises, see PAUL, op. Ct. supra
note 70, at 53 et seq.
92. Supra note 64, at 49.
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"Such adjustment shall be made only if there is adopted in the deter-
mination a position maintained by the Commissioner (in case the amount
of the adjustment would be refunded or credited in the same manner
as an overpayment under subsection (c)) or by the taxpayer with respect
to whom the determination is made (in case the amount of the adjust-
ment would be assessed and collected in the same manner as a deficiency
under subsection (c)), which position is inconsistent with the erroneous
inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, disallowance, recognition, or
nonrecognition, as the case may be."
Thus, if the Commissioner would, under the adjustment, obtain a de-
ficiency for the barred year, such adjustment is not permitted unless the
taxpayer has taken the inconsistent position in the later year. The Com-
missioner may not therefore use Section 820 as a lever to pry open tile
statute of limitations and correct erroneous action where the taxpayer
is quite content to leave the past undisturbed. Likewise, if the Com-
missioner 3 does not awaken the sleeping dog, the taxpayer cannot under
Section 820 obtain a refund as a consequence of his own inconsistent
action.
The inconsistency of the position is ascertained by reference to what
was actually done in the earlier year rather than to what the taxpayer
or the Commissioner may have urged at that time. Thus, suppose the
taxpayer in his return for 1934 included a rental item in gross income.
The Commissioner, however, voluntarily refunded an overpayment on
the ground that the item was income for 1935. The taxpayer then in-
cluded the item in gross income for that year but later, after the expira-
tion of the period of limitations with respect to deficiencies for 1934,
filed a claim for refund based on the ground that tile item was properly
includible in 1934 and the claim is allowed. Although the taxpayer with
respect to 1935 has successfully maintained a position consistent with
the position taken by him with respect to 1934, an adjustment is never-
theless authorized under subsection (b) (3), as the taxpayer's later posi-
tion is inconsistent with the tax result reached for 1934, the erroneous
exclusion of the item from gross income. 4
93. It is arguable that the section fails to cover cases where an officer of the United
States other than the Commissioner maintains the inconsistent position. Suppose that
the taxpayer erroneously included an item in gross income for 1934, included it again in
gross income for 1938 and then is allowed a refund claimed for 1938 hcause of such later
inclusion. Suit for erroneous refund is then instituted in which it is maintained tlat the
item properly belonged in gross income for 1938. As this suit is in the name of the
United States, § 610, REENtUE ACr OF 1928, and is conducted by the Attorney General,
is not that official the one who is maintaining the inconsistent position? As the intent
of the section is clear, the adjustment should be obtained under such circumstances.
94. The disposition of a claim for refund may under some circumstances constitute
the maintenance of an inconsistent position by the Commissioner, as where the t payer
has erroneously included an item in gross income for 1934, has again included such item
in gross income for 1935 and then filed a refund claim which is denied by the Commis-
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A problem is suggested by an example in Article 820(b)-7(a) of
the Regulations under this section. It is there stated that if, in the case
of a taxpayer who had been erroneously allowed a deduction for a closed
year, the Commissioner issued a deficiency for a later year based upon
other items and then in his answer to the taxpayer's petition to the Board
of Tax Appeals voluntarily proposed the allowance of the same deduction
for the later year, no adjustment is authorized if the Board, referring
to the answer of the Commissioner, takes the deduction into account
in its redetermination of the tax for the later year "as the Commissioner,
and not the taxpayer, has maintained a position inconsistent with the
allowance of" the deduction for the earlier year." The Regulations thus
assert that silence on the part of the taxpayer and his acquiescence in
the allowance of the deduction under such circumstances are not equiva-
lent to the maintenance of an inconsistent position. By inference, if the
taxpayer had objected to the allowance of the deduction but had accepted
the benefit of the allowance under the Board's redetermination of tax
liability, the case would not be altered. Presumably, however, if the tax-
payer before the Board affirmatively adopted the inconsistent position
taken by the Commissioner in the latter's answer, an adjustment would
be authorized. While it is arguable that silence plus acceptance of benefits
does not differ materially from this last case, it must be remembered that
we are discussing a normally unreal situation made real only if the
Commissioner, or the taxpayer in the converse situation described in
Article 820(b)-7(b) of the Regulations, attempts to use Section 820
in an inequitable manner. The statutory language in question must con-
sequently be so interpreted as to prevent the taxpayer or the Commissioner
from unfairly forcing the other party into an inconsistent position so as
to obtain a pecuniary advantage through an adjustment under this section.
It has been said that the section authorizes adjustment where an in-
consistent position asserted by the appropriate party during the course
of the proceeding has later been withdrawn prior to its termination. Thus,
suppose a taxpayer who erroneously obtained a deduction for interest
for 1937 claimed, inter alia, the same deduction in a claim for ref und
filed for 1938 after the expiration of the period of limitations on assess-
sioner on the ground that the item properly belonged in 1935. Speaking generally, the
determination and maintenance of the inconsistent position are here embodied in the same
action; more precisely, the disposition of the claim for refund constitutes both a determnna-
"ion and the maintenance of the inconsistent position, and such disposition becomes a
determination upon the expiration of the time for instituting suit with respect to the
denial of the claim for refund.
95. If the Commissioner did not place the deduction in issue through his answer but
chose to leave it undisturbed and the Board sustained the deficiency and in its redeter-
mination of the tax allowed the deduction on its own motion, there is a determination
which allows the deduction, but no adjustment is authorized as the taxpayer has not
maintained an inconsistent position. Such action on the part of the Board, however,
would be contrary to the purpose of Congress in enacting § 820. See discussion hnira,
p. 738 et seq.
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ments for 1937. The refund claim constitutes an assertion of an incon-
sistent position. The taxpayer, however, then notifies the Commissioner
that he withdraws the claim with respect to the interest deduction, but
that the refund claim should remain in force as regards the other items.
The Commissioner nevertheless allows the refund claim for the full
amount claimed, including the interest deduction, and then asserts
that Section 820 authorizes an adjustment with respect to 1937. It has
been stated that such adjustment is permitted and that the section thus
constitutes a trap for the unwary taxpayer. But an interpretation that
would make meaningless and ineffective a withdrawal from an incon-
sistent position previously taken appears unwarranted. The requirement
of adoption in the determination of a position "maintained" by the tax-
payer presupposes a position persevered in to the end by the taxpayer
and not a position abandoned in the course of the controversy. Thus.
the Statement of the House Managers explains that the inconsistent
position must be "successfully maintained.""" While the Regulations do
not consider this question, Under Secretary Magill in approving them
pointed out that "Section 820 was designed to provide equitable relief
and will not be applied to penalize taxpayers in cases in which an incon-
sistent position is inadvertently taken and then withdrawn prior to a
determination."97 This policy, which implies that the section permits the
safe withdrawal of an inconsistent position, is a frank recognition of its
purpose and should lay at rest any fears that may have been aroused."
Section 820 is designed to nullify the advantages which ordinarily
followed shifts of position by either taxpayer or Commissioner and to
operate in such fashion that when a shift is made an adjustment is'
96. Op. cit. supra note 58, at 58; also Report of the Senate Commilee on Finance,
supra note 64, at 50. As indicated in note 89, supra, a waiting period was provided in
which inconsistent positions asserted prior to the enactment of § 820 could be withdrawn.
As the purpose of this waiting period was to avoid the unfairness that would exist if an
inconsistent position antedating § 820 were to result in an adjustment if the determinati~n
occurred after enactment of the section but before the party had a chance to appreciate
its potentialities and withdraw, this provision does not offer support to a contention that
withdrawals after the expiration of the ninety-day period are not effective. Rather, it
merely assumes that with respect to any determination occurring after the ninety-day
period, the parties will have had sufficient time to withdraw from the inconsistent posi-
tion if they so desired and thus avoid adjustment.
97. Treasury Press Release, supra note 62. Consideration is given later to the prob-
lem whether the Commissioner can refuse a refund where the taxpayer to avoid an ad-
justment withdraws from a position taken in a claim for refund and it is clear that the
claim is a proper one. Infra, p. 740.
98. The Report of the Committee on Federal Taxation, ADVANCE Pr.cGnAm OF Ami .t-
cAx BAR AssociATioN, 61st Annual Meeting (1938) 104. included in its parade of hor-
ribles under § 820 the hosts of taxpayers who innocently take inconsistent positions.
Experience would seem rather to point to the conclusion that it is generally the shrewd
taxpayer, or rather his attorney or accountant, who sees the tax advantage to be gained
from the inconsistent position and consequently asserts it.
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authorized which, interest considered, might not only cancel but out-
weigh any advantage gained by the subsequent shift. So far as the tax-
payer is concerned, he would be discouraged from taking inconsistent
positions if the end result were a net loss. While taxpayers might soon
become aware that it cost more to commit than to forego shifts of posi-
tion, the effect of Section 820 upon the Commissioner is not so clear.
The taxpayer is concerned merely with protecting his own interest, and
is free to change his position or maintain it, according to what best
serves his interest. The Commissioner, on the other hand, is bound to
two purposes: the protection of the revenues and the administration of
the internal revenue laws uniformly in accordance with their terms.
Usually the two purposes coincide but they sometimes conflict. Under
normal circumstances the obligation to protect the revenues must yield.
Does Section 820 require a different answer in the circumstances in which
it applies? The nature of this problem can perhaps be best illustrated by
an example. A taxpayer erroneously included an item of rent in gross
income for 1933 and failed to include it in gross income for 1934 where
it properly belonged. If the Commissioner were to assert a deficiency with
respect to the rent for 1934, after the expiration of the period of limita-
tions for 1933, and a determination requiring its inclusion in gross in-
come for 1934 eventuated, the taxpayer would be able to secure an
adjustment. If the amount of the deficiency for 1934 were $100 and
the amount of the adjustment $300, has the Commissioner the right to
withhold a notice of deficiency with respect to 1934 and thereby avoid
the pecuniary disadvantage consequent upon an adjustment ?' Or suppose
the taxpayer had again included the item in gross income for 1Q34 but
had filed a claim for refund so that a denial of the claim would permit
the taxpayer to secure the adjustment for 1933. Could the Commissioner
avoid this consequence by allowing the claim for refund?
It has been contended that in such cases the Commissioner must follow
the mandate of the substantive statute and is obligated to assert the
deficiency or deny the refund, although such action results in the main-
tenance of an inconsistent position.'00 At the outset, however, it must
be realized that in fact few cases of this type clearly call for the assertion
of a deficiency or the denial of a refund, the answer usually being so
debatable as to turn on opinion. The examples above present a typically
doubtful question as to the correct year for which the item should be
returned. Usually neither Commissioner nor taxpayer could state with
confidence that inclusion in 1933 was erroneous and inclusion in 1934
99. The taxpayer does not have this problem. Even assuming that a negligence or
fraud penalty might be imposed for failure to include the rent item in 1934 a way is
always afforded the taxpayer to avoid the problem by including the item and filing a
claim for refund, thereby throwing the burden of taking an inconsiistent position upon
the Commissioner.
100. Report of the Committee on Federal Taxation, op. cit supra note 98.
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would be proper. The taxpayer himself usually has plausible reasons for
including an item in the one year rather than the other by which the
Commissioner may be convinced despite other reasons for including
the item in a different year. Even if the Commissioner were not so
convinced he may nonetheless believe that the very difference of opinion
so beclouds the issue that he is free to follow whichever reasoning best
serves the protection of the revenues. Certainly he would be warranted
in taking the position that as the item has actually once been included
the doubts may be resolved by closing the matter on that basis. This
position would involve an exercise of the same reasonable discretion
that precedes the daily decisions as to whether a particular deficiency
letter should be issued or claim for refund allowed.
In rare cases, however, the issue may be clear-as where an existing
regulation, or stronger still, a Supreme Court decision is directly in point.
Such cases would squarely present the problem whether the Commissioner
is compelled to shift his position or is authorized by Section 820 to
refrain from doing so. The Congressional Committee Reports make four
things plain :101 (1) The taking of inconsistent positions by either taxpayer
or Commissioner is deplored; (2) the taking of inconsistent positions is
to be discouraged by making them pecuniarily inadvisable where the
amount of the adjustment plus interest is greater than the tax advantage
gained by the shift of position; (3) shifts of position are nevertheless
permissible and presumably will still be made where a monetary advantage
would be gained, though here equitable relief by way of an adjustment
will be afforded to the other party; and (4) the section is to operate
even-handedly as respects Commissioner and taxpayer. Section 820 thus
offers definite directions by which the Commissioner may chart his course,
and seems clear Congressional authorization for the Commissioner. in
the exercise of his duty to safeguard the revenues, to be governed by
the same tests that control the taxpa-er. The Commissioner would be
free, therefore, to follow in these situations the course financially most
profitable to the Treasury under Section 820, even where the result would
be the assertion of a deficiency with respect to one taxpayer and the
withholding of such assertion against, or even the granting of a refund to,
another taxpayer, solely to avoid the taking of an inconsistent position
which Congress so strongly disapproved.0 2 Although Congress did not
prohibit shifts of positions entirely for reasons given above, it clearly
thought that the undesirable effect of such shifts demanded corrective
action by nullifying the advantages which formerly they created, even
where it meant a departure otherwise from the command of the statute.
101. See Report of Senate Coininittee on Finance. snpra note 64. at 48-52; STr-
IMENT OF THE HoUsE MANAGES, op. Cit. supra note 58. at 56-59.
102. The criticism of § 820(b) (1) in Comment (193S) 52 HA. L. Rrv. Sl D, 304,
fails to take account of the fact that the deficiency need not be asserted.
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To achieve its purpose it adopted a single standard for both taxpayer
and Commissioner, namely the pecuniary test implicit in Section 820,
making this adoption practically explicit by the 90-day provision for the
withdrawal of pending proceedings.'0 3 The justification for authorizing
this departure from an otherwise uniform application of the law lies in
the conditions, described in the early part of this article, which gave rise
to the need for Section 820.
The foregoing discussion concerning the right of the Commissioner
to depart from an otherwise uniform application of the law to avoid the
maintenance of an inconsistent position would seem likewise to indicate
that Section 820 authorizes the Commissioner, as well as the taxpayer,
to take the necessary procedural steps to secure an adjustment even though
such steps involve action for which there would otherwise be no justifi-
cation. Thus, if a taxpayer took a deduction erroneously for 1933 and
took it again for 1934, the Commissioner, even in the rare case where
it was clear that the deduction was properly taken for 1934, could assert
a deficiency for the sole purpose of obtaining a determination to pave
the way to an adjustment for 1933. Likewise, Section 820 authorizes
the Commissioner to withhold voluntary refund of an overpayment with
respect to which the taxpayer could have claimed a refund had he been
willing to take an inconsistent position. Thus, in the preceding example if
the taxpayer had not taken the deduction in 1934 the Commissioner on
audit of the return would not be obligated to refund the overpayment.
4. Computation of the Amount of the Adjustment.
The principle underlying subsection (d), which deals with the ascer-
tainment of the amount of the adjustment, is a simple one: the tax for
the year with respect to which the error was made is determined, the
error is then corrected, and the difference between the corrected tax result
and the first figure constitutes th amount of the adjustment. Whether
the datum point-the tax previously determined for the taxable year
with respect to which the error was made-may be readily ascertained
depends on the extent to which the tax liability of the taxpayer for that
year was altered after the return was filed. Subsection (d), by providing
that alterations by way of deficiency should be added to the amount shown
on the return and those by way of refund or credit should be subtracted,
adopts, nearly verbatim, the language used in Section 271 to define the
term "deficiency" and to this extent is on familiar ground.10 4 The step
103. "It is provided that the section will not become operative by reason of deternina-
tions made prior to 90 days after the effective date of the act. Thi. affords taxpayer.4
and the Commissioner a reasonable time to decide whether they desire to discontinue
proceedings already begun which may lead to determinations as defined in this section"
STATEMENT OF HOUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 58, at 58.
104. Cf. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, snpra note 64, at 51; Regula-
tions 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(d)-1. Subsection (d), by increasing the
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in the computation that may prove difficult is the correction of the error
in the tax previously determined. Subsection (d) states that "There shall
then be ascertained the increase or decrease in the tax previously deter-
mined which results solely from the correct exclusion, inclusion, allow-
ance, disallowance, recognition, or nonrecognition, of the item, inclusion,
deduction, credit, gain, or loss, which was the subject of the error." The
key word in this provision is "solely," and when reference is made to
the Committee Reports to ascertain its significance, it will be seen that
"solely" bears a heavy burden. The Report of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee includes as one of the principles underlying Section 820 the policy
that the corrective adjustment should "under no circumstances affect the
tax save with respect to the influence of the particular items involved in
the adjustment."'' 05 Further in the Report there appears the statement
that "correction is made only with respect to the item involved in the
determination" and examples are given wherein erroneous treatment of
other items, as to which there was no inconsistent position, is not cor-
rected when the amount of the adjustment is ascertained."' It was thus
clearly the desire of Congress to depart from the principle of Leawis v.
Reynolds °7 in so far as the operation of Section 820 is concerned. The
amount shown on the return by amounts previously assessed as a deficiency, would liter-
ally require addition of any addition to the tax assessed under § 293, as it is assessed
"in the same manner as if it were a deficiency." Section 271, however, has never b-,er
so construed.
To a large extent, subsection (d) assumes that records are available with respect to
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1931 [see subsection (f)], and, more im-
portant, that in any settlements made with respect to the tax liability for those years
lump-sum dispositions were avoided and the various changes in the tax return were care-
fully detailed. Both assumptions appear justifiable as general propositions. The present
Bureau practice favors such treatment of tax settlements and § 820 will undoubtedly
encourage it for the future.
105. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 49.
106. Id. at 51. If the taxpayer erroneously included an item of rent and an item of
interest in gross income for 1934, and erroneously took a deduction for depreciation, and
the Commissioner by way of deficiency sustained by the Board again included the rent
item in gross income for 1938, the adjustment would be with respect to the rent item, and
the error as to the interest item and the depreciation deduction would not be corrected.
Similarly, if deductions for a casualty loss and a bad debt loss were erroneously allowed
for 1934 and an item of salary erroneously included in gross income, and the casualty loss
again allowed for 1938, the adjustment would correct the error as to the casualty loss but
not as to the bad debt loss or the salary item.
107. 284 U. S. 281 (1932). In this case, the Court said: "While the statutes author-
izing refunds do not specifically empower the Commissioner to reaudit a return when-
ever-repayment is claimed, authority therefor is necessarily implied. An overpayment
must appear before refund is authorized. Although the statute of limitations may have
barred the assessment and collection of any additional sum, it does not obliterate the right
of the United States to retain payments already received when they do not exceed the
amount which might have been properly assessed and demanded." Id. at 283. Under
this case, in the first example stated in note 106 above, the Commissioner could presumably,
if § 820 had been silent on this point, offset the adjustment with respect to the rent item
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justification for this departure has been stated earlier in the article; our
concern here is with the manner in which the statutory language expresses
such Congressional policy.
The term "solely" in subsection (d), aided by the language of sub-
section (e), discussed infra, was used to reach the desired result. While
that term would seem adequate for this purpose, its use may give rise
to difficulties, which an example will illustrate.'08 Suppose the item er-
roneously included is the taxpayer's salary for 1937. In his return for
that year the taxpayer had naturally included such salary in computing
his earned income credit. In ascertaining the amount of the adjustment
must the earned income credit be recomputed-in the words of subsection
(d), does "correct exclusion" of the salary item cover both the elinilna-
tion of the salary item from gross income and the collateral consequences
of that elimination? The Regulations, following closely the language of
the Statement of the House Managers,'09 answer this inquiry in the
affirmative:
"If the treatment of any item upon which the tax previously deter-
mined was based, or if the application of any provisions of the internal
revenue laws with respect to such tax, depends upon the amount of income
(e.g., charitable contributions, foreign tax credit, earned income credit),
readjustment in these particulars will be necessary . . . in conformity
with the change in the amount of the income which results from the
correct treatment of the item or items in respect of which the error was
made.""' This interpretation, which emphasizes the word "correct"
in subsection (d), is a desirable one."' Such correction of the collateral
by the amount of tax due because of the erroneous deduction for depreciation. Anti a tax-
payer might argue that the principle of Lewis v. Reynolds should be extended to allow him,
in the second example, an offset based upon the salary item. Cf. Bull v. United State4,
295 U. S. 247 (1935), crediting a barred overpayment under the estate tax against a
deficiency in income tax where the same item was involved. See Comment (1938) 52
HARV. L. REv. 300.
108. The policy underlying subsection (d) may work a hardship in cases where tile
taxpayer has a large number of deductions but only takes on his return deductions sufficient
to produce no tax liability, and the adjustment has the effect of disallowing one of the
deductions taken, so that a tax becomes due, or where the taxpayer has taken many
deductions and the Commissioner does not check all as a few of them are sufficient to
create no tax liability and the adjustment has the effect of including an item in gross
income but it is still offset by the unchecked deductions which turn out to be improper.
It must be remembered that the requirement of inconsistent position permits a party to
avoid adjustment in most of these cases; the taxpayer in the illustration above by siniply
not asserting the inconsistent position could allow the matter to stay at rest. Cf. p, 734
supra.
109. Op. cit. supra note 58, at 57. The Report of the Senate Commintee on Finance,
supra note 64, at 49, speaks of correction affecting the tax "with respect to the infhwnce
of the particular items involved in the adjustment." (italics added).
110. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(d)-1, and example thereunder,
111. The correction of the error may, of course, have the effect of placing the tax-
payer in a higher, or lower, surtax bracket. Other matters, not mentioned in Regulations
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consequences of the error, however, is limited to the year with regard
to which the error was made, and does not extend to the influence of
the error on other years. While subsection (b) states broadly that "the
effect of the error shall be corrected by an adjustment made under this
section", this mandate is qualified by the requirement of subsection (d)
that the amount of the adjustment be determined with reference to the
year with respect to which the error was made, which requirement in
turn refers to the specific errors described in subsection (b) (1)-(5).112
101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, affected by the adjustment in net income are percentage deple-
tion and taxation as a personal holding company. If the return of a corporation for
1938 showed that it had received 65 per cent of its income from the sources specified as
material to taxation as a personal holding company under Title IA, Riv: ',U ACT r
1938, and, as a result of the inclusion of an item of income under the adjustment, the
percentage is increased to 80 per cent, the corporation would be taxed as a personal
holding company if the other requisites under Title IA were present, even though such
taxation involves proof of matters not previously involved in the computation of the tax,
as the fact that more than 50 per cent in value of the outstanding stuck %%as owned,
directly or indirectly, by or for not more than five individuals [see § 402 (a) (2), RvnrE"tt
ACT OF 19381. The Regulations, and likewise the STATEMENT OF THl HovsE 36[ANAM m,
op. cit. supra note 58, thus do not distinguish between a case where, for example, a chari-
table deduction has been claimed on the return, computed by taking 15 per cent of the
net income therein shown, and the adjustment either increases or decreases such net
income, so that the amount of the deduction must be increased or decreased if the proper
percentage is to be maintained, and the case where the return shows a gift to a supposed
charitable organization but no deduction for such gift as the return shows no net income,
and the adjustment, by including an item in gross income, produces net income, so that
a charitable deduction to the extent of 15 per cent of such net income becomes allowable
if it can be shown that the organization was in fact a charitable organization. In the
first case, as a deduction has already been allowed by the Commissioner, he could not
in the computation of the amount of the adjustment raise the question whether the recip-
ient of the gift was in fact a charitable organization, and the problem of computing the
amount of the adjustment is simply a mathematical one; in the second case the question
of the status of the recipient of the gift for the first time becomes important and the
computation of the amount of the adjustment involves proof by the taxpayer on this
issue. It might be argued that as the return did contain an enumeration of the gift as a
charitable one, although no deduction was claimed therefor, the Commissioner could not
assert that the gift was not in fact to a charitable organization.
112. For example, taxation of a corporation as a personal holding company in a given
year depends upon the percentage of income derived from certain sources in previous years.
REVENUE AcT OF 1938, § 402(a) (1). Thus, if a corporation receives SO per cent cof its
income from the designated sources in its taxable year beginning in 1937 and only 70 per
cent in 1938 it remains taxable in 1938 as a personal holding company under Title IA of
the REVxUE ACT OF 1938 because of the 80 per cent in 1937. Suppose that a corporation
was taxed as a personal holding company for 1937 but an adjustment for that year under
§ 820 reduced the percentage to 60 per cent, the corporation being allowed a refund on ac-
count of both the erroneous inclusion of an item in gross income and the cunsequent erron-
eous taxation of the corporation as a personal holding company. If the corporation had
already been taxed as a personal holding company for 1938, where the percentage in that
year was 70 per cent, and that year is closed, the adjustment for 1937, heing restricted y-
the terms of § 820 to 1937 would not extend to a reopening of the return for 1938. If the
1938 taxable year were still open, no problem arises under § 820 regarding the effect of the
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Subsection (d) provides that there be added to the amount of the
decrease in tax any amounts wrongfully collected, as additions to the
tax or interest, as a result of the error. Thus, if the item erroneously
included in gross income had not been stated by the taxpayer on his
return but was later included by way of deficiency assessment, together
with six per cent interest, the amount of the interest is to be added to
the decrease in tax resulting from exclusion of the item.113 An addition
to the tax under Section 293(a) on account of negligence would be
similarly treated.
The discussion so far has been in terms of the income tax under
Title I. As the unjust enrichment tax,'14 the excess-profits tax,115 and
the Title IA surtax on personal holding companies," 0 are all income
taxes, the question arises whether Section 820 is applicable to these taxes,
and if so, in what manner. The heading of the section speaks of "income
adjustment upon the tax for 1938, as the taxpayer or the Commissioner could, as respects
the 1938 tax, prove the proper percentage in 1937 whether or not the year 1937 was closed.
The existence or nonexistence of the proper percentage in 1937 is a question of fact, proof
of which is not affected by the expiration of the period of limitations on refunds or de-
ficiencies for 1937. Thus, in the above example, where the 1938 taxable year is still open,
the taxpayer, independently of § 820, could prove that the proper percentage in 1937 was
60 per cent; or, regardless of the reduction to 60 per cent effected by the adjustment, the
Commissioner could prove that the proper percentage was 80 per cent or more, if a
larger item of income, not involved in the adjustment, had been improperly omitted.
113. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(d)-I, omit the word "wrong-
fully," implying that all interest or additions to the tax collected as a result of the error
were "wrongfully collected." As § 292 of each Revenue Act since 1932 authorizes interest
on "the amount determined as a deficiency," it is arguable that interest collected in literal
compliance with that section has not been "wrongfully collected," so that the term
"wrongfully" would have meaning where there has been a departure from § 292. This nar-
row interpretation, however, would seem contrary to the purpose of § 820 to restore to
the taxpayer those sums of money which had been taken from him as a consequence of
the error, here both the amount of the erroneous deficiency and the interest thereon.
But as this broad interpretation would render meaningless the inclusion of the term
"wrongfully," it may be that subsection (d) proceeds on the assumption that the failure
to include an item of income erroneously included by way of deficiency in the earlier
year might under some circumstances be negligent and thus justify a §293 (a) addition
to the tax, which addition would not be "wrongfully collected."
While the Regulations are silent, the word "collected" would seem to refer to interest
collected by the Commissioner from the taxpayer and not to the reverse situation, so
that interest obtained from the Commissioner by the taxpayer on an erroneous over-
payment is not added to the amount of the adjustment. The presence of "additions to the
tax" which are obtained only by the Commissioner, is persuasive; moreover, the Report
of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 64, at 51, unqualifiedly refers to
"amounts wrongfully collected from the taxpayer, as additions to the tax or interest."
See note 123, infra.
114. Title III, REVENUE AcT OF 1936.
115. Section 602 of Title III, REvENUE AcT oF 1938, and corresponding provisions
of prior Revenue Acts.
116. Title IA, REVENuE ACT OF 1938, and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue
Acts.
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tax cases" and it is applicable to determinations under the "income tax
laws." Moreover, each of the titles imposing the above taxes contains
a provision making applicable thereto all provisions of law applicable
in respect of the taxes imposed by Title I, in so far as not inconsistent.11T
Section 820 itself appears in Title V of the Revenue Act of 1938,
covering "'Miscellaneous Provisions." As there is no express language
in that section limiting its applicability to the Title I tax, and as its
provisions are consistent with the other income taxes, the section would
seem operative with respect to determinations under those taxes. While
the Committee Reports are silent on this point, the Regulations take this
position with respect to the determination and state that a determination
may occur with respect to any one or more of these taxes.118 A more
difficult question arises in connection with the extent of the adjustment.
Suppose that an item of income was erroneously included in gross in-
come for 1934 and a Title I tax and an excess-profits tax were paid
for that year. A determination with respect to only the Title I tax for
1938 again requires the inclusion of the item in gross income. Does
the adjustment under Section 820 extend only to the Title I tax for
1934, or to both the Title I tax and the excess-profits tax? On the one
hand, it may be argued that the effect of tile erroneous inclusion cannot
be fully corrected unless both taxes are adjusted as both depend on the
same income. On the other, it may be contended that subsection (d)
speaks of the tax to be adjusted in the singular---"the tax previously
determined," "the tax shown by the taxpayer . . . upon his return" 110
-and the Committee Reports use similar terminology, implying an
adjustment within the framework of a single tax. Moreover, the first
position would lead to difficulties where correction of the Title I tax
117. E.g., § 409, RzEiVEU Acr oF 1938 (Title IA) ; § 602(c), PREvsEtur Acr or 1933
(excess-profits tax) ; § 503 (a), REVmENE Acr OF 1936 (unjust enrichment tax).
118. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0. Although the tax on
transfers of silver bullion [48 STAT. 1178, § S (1934)] mas validated as an income tax in
United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498 (1937), it is phrased as an excise stamp tax and
its exclusion from the group of income taxes reached by § 820 seems proper. See also
I. T. 2899, XIV-1 CUm. Buu.. 67 (1935); Mim. 4587. 1937-1, Cum. Bt.. 74 (1937).
While the excess profits under the ViNsox.q AcT, 48 ST T. 503 (1934), 49 STAT. 1926
(1935), are collected in accordance with the methods employed to collect Federal income
taxes, the tax is not considered an income tax.
119. While "the tax" might be stretched to mean all of the income taxes paid for
the year ivth respect to which the error was made, "return" would not permit such con-
struction. While the Title I tax and the excess-profits tax are filed on one physical
return, this is not true of the other taxes, and even in the case of the former taxes, two
legal returns are present. Cf. Will County Title Company, 38 B. T. A. No. 1,- (1938),
holding that where the Commissioner had determined a deficiency in income tax for 1934
and an overassessment of excess-profits tax for the same year, a notice of deficiency with
respect to the income tax had been issued, and the taxpayer had filed a petition with the
Board, it had jurisdiction over the deficiency in income tax but not the overassessment of
excess-profits tax.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
was prevented but the excess-profits tax could be adjusted tinder the
customary methods, as where the periods of limitations had expired only
with respect to the former tax. The Regulations resolve this question
in favor of the second position and provide:
"Section 820 may be applied to correct the effect of the error only as
to the tax or taxes for the year with respect to which the error was
made which corresponds to the tax or taxes with respect to which the
determination relates. Thus, if the determination relates to the tax im-
posed by Title I of the Revenue Act of 1938, the adjustment may be
only with respect to the tax imposed by Title I of the Revenue Act
applicable to the year with respect to which the error was made; if
the determination relates to section 602 of Title III of the Revenue
Act of 1938, the adjustment may be only with respect to the tax imposed
by the corresponding provisions of the Revenue Act applicable to the
year with respect to which the error was made." 12A
5. Method of Adjustment.
Subsection (c) provides the method of adjustment. As in the ease
of the computation of the amount of adjustment, the plan is a simple
one: if the amount is an increase over the tax previously determined, it
is recovered in the same manner as a deficiency determined by the Con-
missioner; if a decrease in that tax, in the same manner as an over-
payment claimed by the taxpayer. The deficiency or overpayment, as
the case may be, is for the taxable year with respect to which the error
was made, and the coordination with the procedural tax machinery re-
lating to that year is accomplished by the expedient of as';uming that on
the date of the determination one year remained before the expiration
of the period of limitations upon assessment or filing claim for refund
for such year. Thus, if the error is with respect to the year 1933. the
determination became final in 1938 and the amount of the adjustment
is an increase over the tax previously determined for 1933, it is to be
assessed and collected in the same manner as would a deficiency for
1933 if properly asserted by the Commissioner in 1938-a notice of
deficiency, unless waived, must be sent to the taxpayer1"1 (within one
120. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-0. The language in Art,
820(d)-1(1) to the effect that the tax previously determined may consist of tax imposed
by Title I, Title IA, etc., or "by any one or more of such provisions" must be construed
in harmony with the explicit rule of Art. 820(b)-0 to refer in the latter regard to a case
where the determination related to more than one of these income taxes.
121. Subsection (c), in using the language "as if it were a deficiency determined by
the Commissioner," thus ties in with §272(a) of the REvENUT. AcT or 1938 and cor-
responding provisions of prior Revenue Acts, "If in the case of any taxpayer, the Commis-
sioner determines that there is a deficiency . . . the Commissioner is authorized to send
notice of such deficiency to the ta-kpayer by registered mail." The Senate Draft, in stat-
ing [subsection (d) ] that the amount of adjustment "shall be considered as a deficiency,"
left it doubtful whether there could be any possibility of recourse to judicial review with
respect to the deficiency.
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year from the date of the determination) ; if he fails to petition to the
Board within 90 days the tax may be assessed, etc. The deficiency letter
would, in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, suspend
the running of the one-year period of limitation provided by subsection
(c), and similarly the period of limitations upon collection would com-
mence to run from the date of assessment of the amount of the adjust-
ment. If the taxpayer paid the deficiency, he could file a claim for refund
within two years from the date of payinent, and if such refund were
denied, suit could be brought within two years of the denial. In similar
fashion, where the amount of the adjustment represents a decrease in
tax and consequently is treated as if it were an overpayment claimed by
the taxpayer, the customary refund procedure would be followed-filing
of refund claim, allowance or disallowance by Commissioner, suit for
refund by the taxpayer in the event of a disallowance. 1' -2  As the adjust-
ment is assessed and collected as if it were a deficiency, or refunded or
credited as if it were an overpayment, the amount of the adjustment will
bear the same interest and be subject to the same additions to the tax,
as would orthodox deficiencies and overpayments for the year with respect
to which the error was made." z In some instances, the one-year period
122. STATEMENT OF THE Ho'sE MANAGERS. H. R. REP. No. 2330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1938) 57-58, 59; Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, SEN. REP. No. 15t7, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 52; Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 456, Art. 820(c)-1.
The Committee Reports and the Regulations are silent on the question vdiether sub-
section (c), by assuming that one year remained before the expiration of the period of
limitations upon assessment, authorizes the Commissioner to proceed under § 311 of the
REVENUE ACT OF 1938, and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts, against
a transferee of the taxpayer with respect to whom the deficiency is authorized by § 820,
although previously the period of limitations on assessment had expired as respects such
transferee. As § 311 provides that the period of limitations for assessment of transferee
liability is one year after the expiration of the period of limitations against the taxpayer,
and as § 820 assumes for the purpose of the adjustment that one year of such later periotl
still remains, it is arguable that the period of limitations for assessment of transferee
liability has not expired. On the other hand, it may be said that express lanutiage is
necessary to make a transferee liable for tie amount of the adjustment xvhere the normal
period of limitations provided by § 311 had expired. XWhere that period had not expired,
transferee liability for the amount of the adjustment would exist.
123. Report of the Senate Commnittee on Finance. supra note 12?, at 51-52; Regula-
tions 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(c)-i. The statutory justification for the im-
position of interest and additions to the tax is the phrase "in the -ame manner as if it
were a deficiency . . . or an overpayment." Even if "manner" be defined as referring
to the method or machinery of assessment and collection so that subsection (d) incorpor-
ates only the notice of deficiency procedure, as §§ 291 and 292 are an integral part of
that machinery, they are included within the sweep of subsection (d); a similar conten-
tion can be made with respect to interest on the overpayment. A contrary conclusion
would force Congress to provide specifically for interest and additions to the tax, and
such specification would in turn cast doubt on the incorporation of the other sections
relating to the deficiency procedure which were not specifically mentioned. Moreover,
§ 293, REVEXUE Acr OF 1938, after requiring that an addition to the tax shall be assessed
in the same manner as if it were a deficiency, specifically states that "section 292, relating
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of limitations thus provided may operate to shorten the otherwise ap-
plicable period of limitations, as where the error is with respect to the
taxable year 1937, correction is barred by a closing agreement executed
in 1938 and the determination occurs in March, 1939, so that two years
of the normal period of limitations for 1937 remain unexpired. Under
such circumstances, the Commissioner would nevertheless have only one
year within which to assert the deficiency. 1 4
Subsection (e) provides an exception to the rule of subsection (c)
that the established procedure is to be utilized in making the adjustment.
The exception, however, is introduced solely to buttress the principle
of subsection (d) that the adjustment is only with respect to the item
which was the subject of the error. Thus, subsection (e) provides that
(1) the amount of adjustment cannot be diminished by any credit or
set-off based upon any other item and (2) that if the amount is paid,
it cannot be recovered by a claim or suit for refund, or suit for erroneous
to interest on deficiencies, shall not be applicable," thus indicating that without this excep-
tion the treatment of an addition to the tax as a deficiency would result in interest on the
addition to the tax.
The specific inclusion of interest previously collected by the Commissioner in the amount
of the adjustment under subsection (d) is made necessary by the different dates specified
in the Revenue Acts for the computation of interest. As interest on an overpayment runs
from the date of the overpayment (§ 614, REVENUE ACT OF 1928), so that the interest
in effect provided for by subsection (c) where the amount of the adjustment is an over-
payment runs from the date the taxpayer paid the erroneous deficiency and the interest
thereon, the interest so paid on the deficiency would not have been recovered by the tax-
payer unless it were included in the amount of the adjustment; interest on interest there-
after is proper as the taxpayer has been wrongly deprived of the use of the interest paid
by him on the erroneous deficiency. In view of the reason for the specific mention of
interest in subsection (d), it therefore does not follow from such explicit reference that
Congress did not intend to provide for interest in connection with subsection (c). Interest
on a deficiency, however, runs from the date prescribed for payment of the tax (§ 292),
so that if an amount had erroneously been refunded in the earlier year together with
interest thereon, subsection (c), by providing in effect, where adjustment is by way of
deficiency, for interest, on the amount erroneously refunded, for the period between the
date the tax was due and the date of the refund payment, as well as for thereafter, restores
to the Commissioner the interest wrongly paid to the taxpayer with respect to that
period and thereby makes it unnecessary to add that amount to the amount of the adjust-
ment. If the amount of such interest had been added to the amount of the adjustment, as
in the case of an overpayment, the Commissioner would have twice obtained interest for
the period between the payment of the tax and the date of the refund. But the Commis-
sioner fails to obtain interest on such interest for the period from the date of the prior
refund to the date of assessment of the amount of the adjustment, although the taxpayer
by virtue of subsection (d) would obtain interest on such interest for the corresponding
period.
124. Regulations 101, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(c)-i. The STTEMET OF rT1E Hot' Si MAI-
AGERS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 59, that "the Commissioner has at least one year within
which to issue a notice of deficiency in respect of the amount of the adjustment" would
seem inaccurate unless the "at least" assumes that a waiver of the one-year period has
been obtained.
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refund, based upon any other item. The Commissioner cannot offset
against the taxpayer's claim for refund of the amount of adjustment,
where it is a decrease in tax, the amount of tax due on account of er-
roneous treatment of another item; nor can the Commissioner, after
the amount of the adjustment is refunded, accomplish the same result
in a suit for erroneous refund. Similarly, the taxpayer cannot, where
the adjustment is treated as if it were a deficiency, in a contest of such
deficiency before the Board claim an offset because of erroneous treat-
ment of another item; nor can he, if he paid such deficiency, utilize such
payment to support a claim for refund with respect to that item. This
subsection also operates as a limitation upon the powers of the courts
and the Board of Tax Appeals. While the established procedure is thus
made available under subsection (c), careful safeguards have been inserted
to prevent the amount of the adjustment from being affected by other
items. 125
While Section 820, in utilizing established procedure to effect the
adjustment authorized, provides for a notice of deficiency or a claim
for refund, with the possibility of subsequent litigation in the Board or
the courts with respect to the adjustment,'2 it does not follow that this
procedure must be pursued in its entirety to obtain an adjustment. In
most cases, as a consequence of the determination, there will be no ques-
tion as to the propriety or amount of the adjustment, so that the parties
may accomplish in one transaction both the settlement of the tax liability
for the year with respect to which the determination is made and the
adjustment authorized under Section 820. If there is a deficiency for
the later year because the item is required to be included in gross income,
the amount of the adjustment will represent a decrease in tax, because
of correction of the erroneous inclusion of the item in gross income for
the earlier year, and that amount, treated as if it were an overpayment,
may be credited against the deficiency in accordance with the customary
practice.117 Similarly, if there is an overpayment for the year with respect
to which the determination is made because of the allowance of a deduc-
tion, such ovefpayment may be credited against the amount of the adjust-
125. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, snpra note 122, at 52: STATMAENT
OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS, Op. cit. supra note 1M, at 57-58; Regulations 101, Appendix,
T. D. 4856, Art. 820(e)-i, and examples flerein.
126. See p. 752 infra. pointing out that litigation may be necessary to establish the
error with respect to the earlier year. Other controversial questions relating to the ad-
justment may also arise in particular cases, e.g.. whether the amount of the adjustment
was properly computed, whether at the time the determination became final correction
under the usual methods was barred, etc.
127. Section 322(a) of the REVExcrE Act oF 1938, and corresponding provisions of
prior Revenue Acts, provide that "Where there has been an overpayment of any tax
imposed by this title, the amount of such overpayment shall be credited against any
income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax or installment thereof then due from the tax-
payer, and any balance shall be refunded immediately to the taxpayer."
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ment, here an increase in tax.12' This crediting of or against the amount
of the adjustment is not limited to tax due, or overpayments, for the
year with respect to which the determination is made, but extends to
any year, even the year of the adjustment, provided that any tax due
for that year or any overpayment has been ascertained and is still col-
lectible.'29 As such action does not constitute a departure from the
principle expressed in subsection (d), it is not prohibited by subsection
(e) ;130 adjustments under Section 820 may consequently be made ex-
peditiously and without the necessity of a separate proceeding."'
We proceed now to consider the kinds of cases, enumerated in subsec-
tion (b), to which the section extends.
F. CLASSES OF CASES IN WHICH ADJUSTMENT Is AUTHORIZE*D
Double Inclusion of an Item in Gross Income.
Subsection (b) (1) specifies the case where the determination requires
"the inclusion in gross income of an item which was erroneously in-
cluded in the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or
in the gross income of a related taxpayer." The general situation falling
under subsection (b) (1) is illustrated by the example given in the Regu-
lations: a lessor-taxpayer, who kept his books on a cash basis, errone-
ously included an item of accrued rent in his return for 1933. In 1938,
after the expiration of the period of limitations on refunds for 1933,
128. See note 127, supra.
129. Thus, the crediting must not be prohibited by § 609, REvENvuE ACT OF 1928.
130. The crediting of the amount of the adjustment, where it represents an over-
payment against an income tax then due, does not in legal effect diminish such amount,
as it is used to pay the tax due; likewise the crediting of an overpayment against the
amount of the adjustment, where it is treated as if it were a deficiency, does not diminish
such amount as it is in effect being paid by the credit. Subsection (e) must thus be read
in the light of its purpose, and the phrase "the amount . . . shall not be diminished by
any credit," must be interpreted as prohibiting, not the crediting referred to in the text,
but rather any attempt to defeat the principle of subsection (d). In this regard, the
STATEMENT OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS makes this plain: "Subsections (d) and (v) indi-
cate, however, that the adjustment, both with respect to the ascertainment of the amount of
the adjustment and the later proceedings for its collection or refund, is unaffected by any
other items not taken into consideration in computing the tax previously determined.
The amount of the adjustment, if an overpayment, may of course tinder established pro-
cedure be credited against any income tax then due from the taxpayers, or if a deficiency
may correspondingly be set off against any refund of income tax due to the taxpayer."
-Op. cit. supra note 122, at 57-58.
131. In approving the Regulations, Under Secretary Magill stated that "so far as
possible such adjustment would be expedited by settling the tax liability for the open
year and the adjustment for the closed year in one proceeding." Treasury Press Release
No. 14-38, 383 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Tax Serv. 16502. There is therefore no foundation
for the fear expressed in the Report of the Committee on Federal Taxation, ADVANCr
PROGRAM OF AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATI N, 61st Annual Meeting (1938) 104, that § 820
"contemplates in every case of inconsistency two separate proceedings."
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the Commissioner ascertained that the rent was received in 1934 and
asserted a deficiency for that year, which is sustained in 1941 by
the Board of Tax Appeals. As the determination - the Board decision
-requires the inclusion in gross income 132 of an item - rent re-
ceived in 1934--erroneously included in gross income for another year,
an adjustment is authorized."a As the Regulations point out, the deter-
mination need not arise from the assertion of a deficiency in the later
year, for if the taxpayer himself had included the rent in gross mcinme
for 1934 and had filed a claim for refund which was denied, an adjust-
ment would also be authorized. 34 Nor need the erroneous inclusion be
made by the taxpayer in his return, for if the inclusion in gross income
for 1933 had resulted from the taxpayer's payment of a deficiency as-
serted for 1933 because of the non-inclusion of the rent in the return
for that year, an adjustment would still be authorized.
Subsection (b) (1) emphasizes the reliance placed by Section 820 upoin
the "item" concept of tax liability. The tax liability for a year is gener-
ally a unitary matter, and the concern is whether the correct dollars and
cents total has been determined. 3 Section 820, however, fastens upson
the treatment accorded a particular item in different years regardless (f
the correct dollars and cents tax liability for those years. Some difficulty,
therefore, may arise in ascertaining what is an "item." The term is not
a new one in the income tax-Section 42 refers to the "amount of all
items of gross income," Section 22(b) provides that the "following
132. The term "requires" in subsections (b) (1) and (3), like the term "allows" in
subsections (b) (2) (3) and (4), and the terms "denies" and "disallows" in subsections
(b) (4) and (5), refers to action compelled by the determination and not, for example,
to what should be done in accordance with dicta in a court decision. Thus, if an item
of income is included in gross income for 1933 and the Commissioner asserts a deficiency
stating that the item belongs in gross income for 1935, no adjustment is authorized if
the court rules that the item does not belong in 1935 as it is properly includible in 1934.
If, however, the taxpayer had brought suit for refund for 1934 based upon an unrelated
item and under Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U. S. 281 (1932), the Commissioner succe-,fully
offset the refund by the amount of tax owing because of the failure to include the item
in gross income for 1934, the determination here requires the inclusion of an item in gross
income and an adjustment is authorized; this follows even if such amount of tax is
greater than the refund sought.
133. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-1. See Report of the Senate
Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 48.
134. While it may be argued that the taxpayer has maintained an inconsistent p ',I-
tion in his return, the Commissioner, by the denial of the claim for refund, has clearly
maintained an inconsistent position, and the condition in subsection (b) is therefore met.
See note 94, supra.
135. The concepts of deficiency and overpayment clearly envisage tax liability as a
unitary matter. The rules that a notice of deficiency may be sustained if tax is owing
on a theory different from that relied upon in the notice, that only a single suit for refund
may be maintained, that set-off is permissible in a suit for refund or erroneous refund,
similarly rest upon such a unitary concept.
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items shall not be included in gross income." The term "item" thus refers
in a qualitative sense to the various matters which make up gross income
- salary, dividends, rent, gain on sale of a capital asset, distributed trust
income, interest, etc.136 Salary for 1937 and salary for 1938 are two
different items, though in each case the amount may be $10,000. But
if the item is qualitatively the same, as salary for 1937 included in gross
income for 1937 and again for 1940, it is immaterial that there is a
quantitative difference. Hence, if the salary was paid in property and
when included for 1937, the property was valued at $10,000 and when
again required to be included in 1940 it was valued at $8,000, the in-
clusion of the entire $10,000 is to be adjusted under Section 820. But
if a salary of $5,000 was received from A and a salary of $5.000
received from B, and both are included for 1937, and if later the $5,000
salary from B is included again for 1940, an adjustment is authorized only
with respect to the $5,000 salary from B included for 1937-salary from
A and salary from B are different items, even though they relate to the
same year.137
It will be observed that subsection (b) (1) refers to the erroneous
inclusion of the item in the earlier year,13 s and the remaining categories
in subsection (b) also turn on erroneous action. The inclusion required
by the determination with respect to the later year does not tinder Sec-
tion 820 ipso facto establish the error for the earlier year. The coverage
136. The term "item" is used in this sense-an item of gross income-in subsections
(b) (1), (b) (3), (d) and (e). In subsection (a) (1) (C), however, the term "items"
is used loosely to cover not only an "item," as used in the above subsections, but also a
deduction, a credit, an inclusion [as used in subsection (b) (3) ], etc. As pointed out
above, subsection (a) (1) (C), in its tracing of the disposition of the various items in
the claim for refund, likewise departs from a unitary tax concept.
137. Where an item of income such as bond premium is erroneously included in its
entirety for a single year and thereafter the bond premium is properly allocated over a
number of years, the inclusion in gross income for a later year of the amount allocated
to that year would provide the identity of items required in subsection (b) (1) and an
adjustment would be authorized with respect to the entire sum erroneously included.
Conversely, if the amount had previously been erroneously allocated over a number of
years, and the entire amount is properly included in a later year, an adjustment would
be authorized for each of the prior years in which an allocated amount had been included.
138. While the discussion throughout has assumed that the adjustment i's made with
respect to a year chronologically earlier than that with respect to which the determina-
tion is made, subsection (b) (1), as well as subsections (b) (2) and (3), do not impose
such a temporal limitation. Although most of the cases under these subsections will follow
this time pattern, it is possible that the determination may be with respect to the earlier
year and the adjustment for the later year, where the former has been held open, by
waiver for example, even after the latter has been closed. See also note 140, hilra. In
subsections (b) (1) (2) and (3), where related taxpayers are involved, determination
and adjustment may relate to the same calendar year. In subsection (b) (4), determina-
tion and adjustment will generally relate to the same calendar year (see note 157, infra)
and in subsection (b) (5), the determination will relate to the same or a later year, but
never an earlier year, because of the special cases covered by these subsections.
SECTION 820 OF THE REVENUE ACT
of related taxpayers within the scope of the section made any such auto-
matic rule impossible, as will be explained later. Accordingly, even after
the determination requiring the inclusion in gross income is obtained,
the adjustment depends upon the question whether the earlier inclusion
was erroneous. But, while the structure of Section 820 thus permits two
proceedings, in practice the proceeding culminating in the determination
will usually establish the error. If the determination is a court or Board
decision, res judicata will tie the error to the determination;' if the
determination is a closing agreement or disposition of a claim for refund,
the joint conduct of the parties (a disallowed claim for refund must be
acquiesced in by the taxpayer) for the year of the determination -will
serve to link determination and error. 4 ° While the determination will
thus generally dispose of the question whether the earlier action was
erroneous, where the question must be decided independently of the deter-
mination, the standard is that of the internal revenue laws applicable
to the year with respect to which it is alleged the error occurred. The
fact that at the time the item was included in gross income for the earlier
year such inclusion was in accordance with the then prevailing administra-
tive or judicial interpretation of the internal revenue laws is not finally
determinative of the question, for if such interpretation is later authori-
tatively altered, by court decision, the inclusion is erroneous within the
139. See p. 728 sipra. Where related taxpayers are involved, however, see p. 773,
infra.
140. The text assumes that in most situations involving a determination by way of
dosing agreement or disposition of a claim for refund, the parties will likewise be in
agreement as to the adjustment for the earlier year. In cases where such complete agree-
ment is not present, an additional step may be necessary under § 820. Thus, suppose the tax-
payer by dosing agreement acquiesced in the inclusion of an item of rent in gross ino'me
for 1935, although he had erroneously included such item in gross income for 1934 and
the period of limitations for refund claims for 1934 had expired. The taxpayer then files
a refund claim for the amount of the adjustment for 1934, but the Commissioner con-
tends that the inclusion in 1934 was proper and that it is the inclusion for 1935 which
was erroneous. The court agrees with the Commissioner. An adjustment would then be
authorized for 1935 under subsection (b) (1). In some instances, however, § 820 may
not permit the second adjustment. Suppose the taxpayer hms erroneously taken a deduc-
tion for 1934 and after the period of limitation on assessments for 1934, files a claim for
refund for 1935 in which he again claims the deduction. The deduction is allowed, but
the Commissioner offsets the amount of the refund by a deficiency based upon other
items, so that the claim for refund is disallowed and a deficiency asserted. As the allow-
ance of the deduction is a determination under subsection (a) (1) (C) (i), the Commis-
sioner is entitled to an adjustment for 1934 under subsection (b) (2). Assume that such
adjustment is obtained. Thereafter, the taxpayer contests the deficiency for 1935 before
the Board. The Commissioner then asserts in his answer an additional deficiency for
1935 because of the allowance of the deduction, now stating such allowance w,,as erro-
neous. The Board sustains the Commissioner. As the failure to obtain a deduction in
any year is not covered in subsection (b), no adjustment is authorized. The taxpayer,
however, could protect himself in this rare case by refusing to pay the adjustment for
1934 until he obtained a closing agreement with respect to the deduction for 1935.
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meaning of Section 820.141 Any other interpretation would in large part
nullify the effect of the section, for it is just such shifts in judicial inter-
pretation which principally give rise to the successful maintenance of
inconsistent positions.
42
Double Allowance of Deduction or Credit.
Subsection (b) (2) is the complementary paragraph to subsection (b)
(1), for it covers the case where the determination allows a deduction
or credit erroneously allowed to the taxpayer for another taxable year
or to a related taxpayer. The terms "deduction" and "credit," like the
term "item," embody the same divisible concept of tax liability and follow
the terminology of Section 23 ("there shall be allowed as deductions")
and Section 25 ("there shall be allowed . . . the following credits
against the net income."). Also, as in subsection (b) (1), the manner
in which the allowance occurred or in which the proceeding leading to
the determination arose are immaterial. The taxpayer in the earlier year
may have taken the deduction in his return, or obtained it by way of
claim for refund or voluntary refund on the part of the Commissioner;
he may have again taken the deduction in his return for the later year,
or obtained it by way of a refund. 4 '
Exclusion of Item of Gross Income With Respect to Which Tax Was
Paid.
Subsection (b) (3) deals with a more difficult situation-the deter-
mination requires "the exclusion from gross income of an item with
respect to which tax was paid and which was erroneously excluded or
141. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-6. Cf. the language in the
STATFMENT OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 56. that there is re-
quired "a final 'determination' . . . which . . . indicates that the previous treatment of
the item was erroneous under the applicable provisions of the internal-revenue laws."
The word "indicates" merely refers to the effect that will be given to the determination
in general practice.
142. Suppose that an item of gross income were erroneously omitted for 1934, though
its omission was thought proper at that time. Thereafter, the taxpayer included such
item in 1935 and then was successful in a refund suit, the Supreme Court stating that
the item should properly have been included in gross income for 1934. For adninistrative
reasons the Commissioner acts under § 506 of the REvENUE ACT oF 1934 and prescribes
that the decision should be applied without retroactive effect. While the omission of the
item for 1934 is erroneous, whether the Commissioner will seek an adjustment depends
upon whether his action under § 506 extends to § 820 situations.
143. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-2. Comment (1938) 52
HARM. L. REv. 300, 306, contends that § 820 may not apply where the deduction in the
later year is taken in the return, as the determination following the assertion of a de-
ficiency would not provide a credit which the taxpayer could apply against the adjust-
meni for the earlier year. It is difficult to see any basis for this contention. The taxpayer
obtained a monetary advantage by taking the deduction in the return; § 820 does not
necessitate that the determination requires a passage of money. Cf. Regulations 101,
Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-I, Example (1), last sentence.
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omitted from the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year
or from the gross income of a related taxpayer." Here again the manner
in which the error occurred is immaterial-the taxpayer may not have
included the item in his return or he may have returned it and obtained
its exclusion by a claim for refund, or the refund may have been made
voluntarily by the Commissioner. But the manner in which the exclusion
in the later year occurred is highly important, for the subsection applies
only where a tax has been paid for the later year with respect to the
item. The tax may have been paid in only two ways-the item was
included by the taxpayer in his return or he paid a deficiency which was
asserted because of his failure to include the item. Consequently, where
the item was not included in the return and any deficiency asserted because
of such omission has not been paid but contested as a deficiency through-
out, this subsection will not be applicable.'"
While the tax-payer who thus wishes to avoid an adjustment under
Section 820 is required to contest the matter in the Board1' and may
not proceed by way of refund suit in the District Courts or the Court
of Claims, a sound reason exists for such rigid dichotomy. Suppose the
following case: a taxpayer received payments in 1937 under a contract
for the performance of services and included the payments in his return
for that year. After the expiration of the period of limitations on assess-
ments for 1936, the taxpayer filed a claim for refund for the year 1937,
asserting that he kept his books on the accrual basis and that, as the
payments had accrued in 1936, they were properly taxable in that year.
Although the taxpayer may have honestly thought he was acting properly
when he included the payments in his return for 1937, such inclusion
may well have lulled the Commissioner into not taking action with respect
to 1936 while such action would have still been timely. The omission for
1936 and the inclusion for 1937 are objective indications that the tax-
payer intended to pay some tax on the payments: he first thought 1937
was the proper year, and then realized that he could take advantage of
the running of the statute of limitations to avoid tax entirely. Conse-
quently, the shift of position properly gives rise to an adjustment. But
suppose the tax-payer either thought he did not owe a tax at all with respect
144. Where the taxpayer has filed claim for refund on an unrelated deduction and
the Commissioner allows the claim but reduces the amount claimed by the amount of tax
allegedly due because of the failure to include the item in gross income, and the tax-
payer thereafter successfully recovers the difference between is original claim and the
amount allowed, the court holding that the item does not belong in gross income, tax
has not been paid with respect to that item-rather, the proper amount due the taxpayer
because of the deduction had not been refunded.
145. The taxpayer cannot avail himself of §§ 322(d) and 809 of the RE:.v- Acv
OF 1938, permitting the filing of a petition even where there is payment of the deficiency
after the mailing of the notice of deficiency, and authorizing the Board to find an over-
payment, if othenise proper, in such case, as such payment would bring the case within
subsection (b) (3). Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 20(b)-3, Example (1).
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to the payments and consequently omitted them from his returns for
1936 and 1937, or negligently failed to include them for 1936, the proper
year. In either case, after the period of limitations has expired, the
policy underlying the statute of limitations would give repose to such a
situation. The taxpayer here has not taken an inconsistent position-
he has simply failed to pay a tax. But if subsection (b) (3) were ex-
tended to the case where a determination required the exclusion of an
item from gross income which had previously been erroneously excluded
or omitted, so that an adjustment would be authorized without regard
to the payment of tax with respect to the item, the statute of limitations
would be swept aside. In the second situation presented above, if the
Commissioner discovered the omission after the period of limitations had
expired on assessments for 1936, he could simply assert a deficiency for
1940, or 1941, and so on, although knowing full well that such deficiency
could not be upheld, thereby forcing the taxpayer to contend that the
item belonged in 1936, and thus to take a position inconsistent with its
omission in that year. 40 After the Board had ruled against the deficiency,
the Commissioner could then claim an adjustment for 1936. Section 820
would thus have offered an easy method to open the statute of limitations
on assessments, with the result that there would simply be no statute of
limitations on assessments for failure to include items in gross income.
In restricting subsection (b) (3) to the case where the tax had been paid
in the later year, Congress was simply acting to "preserve unimpaired
the essential function of the statute of limitations,"' 1 though this meant
146. In view of the prima facie effect of the notice of deficiency, the risk of simply
defending on the ground that the item did not belong in the year asserted by the Com-
missioner would generally be too great, so that the taxpayer would be forced to defend
on the ground that the item belonged in the year in which it was erroneously omitted.
If his defense did not rest upon the ground that the item properly belonged in such year,
there would be no maintenance of an inconsistent position.
147. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 49. Subsection
(b) (3) may in part be analogized to decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that
it would be inequitable to permit the taxpayer to recover money from the Government
when tax is still owed to it on the same transaction. "It must be owned that there is
much justice in this; and the argument would be particularly strong, were the taxpayer
seeking to get back what he had paid, since he could then recover only cx acquo et bona.
Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 . . . Yet even then, McEachern v. Rose, 302 U. S. 56
(1938), would stand in the way, since under . . . section § 609 (a) of the Revenue Act
of 1928 the credit of any sums due in the later year would be 'void' against an assessnent,
payment of which would have to be refunded under . . . section § 607 of the Revenue
Act of 1928. But no deficiency is justified for another and more fundamental reason. The
question is of the validity of a tax, in computing which the net income-calculated by
deducting what the statute allows-must be the multiplicand, regardless of whether any
of the deductions have already been wrongfully taken in earlier years. The doctrines of a
court of equity are irrelevant to the levying of taxes; Congress alone lays down the con-
ditions, and has not attempted to bring other years into hotch-pot. Quite other considera-
tions decide whether a sum, once paid as a tax, shall be recovered; the mere payment
creates no obligation to return it, the taxpayer makes it at the peril of showing that in
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allowing some taxpayers-as the taxpayer who thought in 1936 that the
payment belonged in 1937 but then changed his mind before filing his
return for 1937-to avoid a tax. Where the taxpayer failed to include
the item in his return for the later year but paid when the deficiency
was asserted for the later year solely because he preferred to litigate in
the District Court rather than the Board, it may seem that no adjustment
should be authorized as the payment of tax does not here serve as an
objective manifestation of the course of conduct charted by the taxpayer.
Another taxpayer, however, may have paid the deficiency because he
thought it correct but later decided to change his position because of the
favorable opportunity presented by the expiration of the period of limita-
tions for the earlier year. As there is no feasible method of differentiating
between the two cases, and as the taxpayer against whom the deficiency
is asserted can protect himself from an adjustment under Section 820
simply by not paying the deficiency, no unjustifiable hardship is worked
by the rule adopted in subsection (b) (3).'as
This underlying desire of Congress to maintain unimpaired the purpose
of the statute of limitations is evidenced when we consider the comple-
mentary case of deductions. The report of the House Subcommittee
stressing the need for corrective action in cases involving misuse of the
statute of limitations, noted the following situation:
"Taxpayers frequently claim deductions which the Commissioner denies
because he believes that, although the deductions are allowable under the
revenue act, they should be taken in a different year" 140 and recommended
that "there be prepared suitable provisions under which the statute of
limitations should be so adjusted as to insure the taxation of income, and
common justice it ought not to be retained." Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F. (2d)
680, 683 (C. C.A. 2d, 1938).
148. An interesting situation may develop in this connection under subsections (b) (1)
and (2). Suppose a deduction has been taken in 1937 and again in 1938 but the period
of limitations With respect to both years has expired. A deficiency is then asserted with
respect to 1938 on the ground that the deduction was improper. The taxpayer contends
that the period of limitations had expired and the Board sustains this position. Section
906(e) of the REvFxun Acr OF 1924, as amended, provides that "if the assessment or
collection of any tax is barred by any statute of limitations, the decision of the Board
to that effect shall be considered as its decision that there is no deficiency in respect of
such tax." May the Commissioner then contend that by virtue of this section there is
a determination that allowed the deduction for 1938, as there is no deficiency for 1933,
and accordingly an adjustment is authorized With respect to 1937? It is obvious that Con-
gress did not intend the answer to be in the affirmative. As the taxpayer has not main-
tained an inconsistent position and as the determination does not adopt an inconsistent
position even if the taxpayer had defended on the double ground of the statute of limita-
tions and the propriety of the deduction in 1938, § 820 would seem inapplicable. It may be
noted that in the complementary situation, that of overpayments, there is no provision
comparable to § 906 (e) of the REvEN E Acr OF 1924, as amended.
149. REPORT OF A SUBCOMMacrTTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON A
PROPOSED REVISION OF THE REVENUE LAWS, M. R. 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 54.
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the allowance of deductions, in the year to which properly allowable." '
And the Senate Report stated that "Corrective adjustments should pro-
duce the effect of attributing income or deductions to the right year and
the right taxpayer ... As a result, many tax attorneys thought
that Section 820 would remedy the bad debt situation"- by providing
an adjustment where a taxpayer who claimed a bad debt deduction for
1938 finally discovered, after controversy with the Commissioner or
litigation in the courts, and after the expiration of the period of linmita-
tions for 1935, that the debt had become worthless in 1935. Section 820,
however, in neither initial nor final form, covered the situation where the
determination disallows a deduction which was erroneously disallowed
or omitted in another taxable year. The omission of this case from
Section 820 has given rise to severe criticism of the section. and yet
from the discussion above it is clear that its inclusion would have had
the effect of destroying the statute of limitations with respect to deduc-
tions. The taxpayer who neglected to take a deduction properly allowable
for 1935, as to which year the period of limitations on refund claims had
expired, could take that deduction in his return for 1940, or 1941, etc.,
or claim a refund for those years, force the Commissioner to take a
position inconsistent with the omission of the deduction in 1935,"' and
then, after the Commissioner had won the case, claim an adjustment
for 1935. Congress recognized that Section 820 was not the proper
vehicle for solving the bad debt problem, for the cure would have been
worse than the disease, and consequently the "failure to obtain a deduc-
tion" case is not found in subsection (b) .14 Congress, however, did
150. Id. at 79.
151. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 49.
152. For a discussion of the bad debt problem and suggestions for its solution, see
PAUL, STUDIEs IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1st Series 1937) 255 et seq.
153. The text assumes that the Commissioner to win the case would be forced to
specify the year in which the deduction was properly allowable, here 1935. so that he
would thereby be maintaining an inconsistent position. If, as is the situation in most bad
debt and stock worthlessness cases, the Commissioner successfully defended solely on tle
ground that the debt did not become bad, or the stock worthless, in the year claimed by the
taxpayer, and did not specify the year in which the deduction was properly allowable,
there would not be a maintenance of an inconsistent position by the Commissioner and
an adjustment could not be obtained by the taxpayer even if the "failure to obtain a
deduction" situation were covered in subsection (b).
154. While a shift of position was evident in the omission of income cases where ta,
was later paid, so that subsection (b) (3) could be included, Congress apparently thought
that there was no comparable standard in the deduction cases. It may be possible to pro-
vide that, if the deduction had been denied by the Commissioner for the earlier year, later
disallowance, where the Commissioner had maintained that the deduction was allowable
for the' year for which it had previously been claimed and denied, would result in an
adjustment, as here the earlier denial indicates the shift of position on the part of the
Commissioner and thus provides a standard whereby the case in which the Commissioner
took no action with respect to the earlier year may be differentiated. If, however, the
later disallowance did not involve the maintenance of an inconsistent position, but simply
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attempt to ameliorate the problem by providing in Section 801 that a
closing agreement could relate to a taxable year not yet closed.1 5 Under
this section, a tax-payer who claims a bad debt deduction for 1938 which
is disallowed in 1939 on the ground that the debt has not yet become
worthless can protect himself to some extent against a later shift in
position by obtaining a closing agreement providing that if the deduction
is disallowed when claimed again for a later year on the ground that
it was properly allowable for 1938, an adjustment would be made for
1938.156
Correlatiz'e Deductions and Inclusions Specified in Section 102(b) and
(c), Revenue Act of 1938. and Corresponding Provisions of Prior Rezve-
nue Acts.
Subsection (b) (4) covers the special class of cases involving the allo-
cation of tax between trust or estate on the one hand and beneficiaries,
heirs and legatees on the oilier. Section 162(h) of the Revenue Act
of 1938, in harmony with prior Acts, provides that the trust shall he
allowed as an additional deduction in computing net income the amount
which is to be distributed currently to the beneficiaries, but that the
amount so allowed as a deduction shall be included in computing the net
income of the beneficiaries whether distributed or not. Similar treat-
ment is provided by Section 162(c) for income received by the estate
during the period of administration and income which may le either
resulted from the successful assertion by the Commissioner that the deduction v'.as not
allowable in the later year, no adjustment could be secured. See note 153, supra. It has
been suggested, Comment (1938) 52 HIv. L. REv. 300, 304, that adjustment be allowed
to the taxpayer who claimed a deduction in the wrong year when he could prove that he
had acted in good faith. The academic merit of such a plan is outweighed, however, by
practical administrative difficulties.
155. Section 801, Rv ,xxvu Acr OF 1938, amending §6 06(a), REmmriU Acr o, 1923,
which limited closing agreements to years "ending prior to the date of the agreement."
156. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4855; Commissioner's .Mimeo gaph, No. 4,21,
August 19, 1938, stating that "A closing agreement as to specific matters, Form 5
should be secured whenever the taxpayer and the Commissioner have concurred in the
disposition of an item and such closing agreement is considered necessary to insure
consistent treatment of such item in any other taxable period." Here again, however,
compare note 153, supra.
Similarly, the closing agreement device may be used in the "failure to include income'
cases not covered by subsection (b) (3) as tax has not been paid. Another administrative
device has been suggested to ameliorate situations in which taxable items have been
completely omitted or the benefit of lawful deductions denied. This proposal in substance
is that a deficiency letter with respect to the alleged improper omission of an item of
income for a particular year shall have the same effect in tolling the statute of limita-
tions as if corresponding deficiency letters had been duly issued for every taxable year
then open; and, correspondingly, that a claim to the benefit of a deduction made in a
return or a claim for refund shal be given like effect with respect to every open taxable
year. Fullr consideration of this suggestion would involve a prolonged excursion into
matters foreign to the main topic of the present article.
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distributed or accumulated in the discretion of the fiduciary. Subsection
(b) (4) relates solely to the special deductions and inclusions thus pro-
vided for in Section 162(b) and (c), and by authorizing an adjustment
makes possible the correct allocation of trust income in situations where
such allocation is prevented by the statute of limitations or sonic other
provision of the internal revenue laws. Thus, suppose a trustee claimed
in the trust return for 1935 a deduction for amounts distributed to the
beneficiary. The beneficiary included the amounts in his return for that
year. In 1938, the Commissioner asserted a deficiency against the trustee
on the ground that the amounts distributed to the beneficiary represented
a charge against the trust corpus and did not constitute a distribution of
income. The deficiency is sustained by final decision of the Board of
Tax Appeals in 1941, after the expiration of the period of limitations
for filing claim for refund by the beneficiary for 1935. Subsection (b) (4)
authorizes an adjustment with respect to the beneficiary's tax for 1935.107
All of the tax possibilities inherent in the trustee-beneficiary relation-
ship are not covered by Section (b) (4). As fiduciary and beneficiary
157. Regulations 101, Appendix. T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-4, indicate the various types
of cases that may arise under subsection (b) (4). Suppose the beneficiary erroneously
failed to include income distributable by the trust but the trustee properly took the addi-
tional deduction. The beneficiary's case is closed by a cldsing agreement but the period
of limitations has not yet expired with respect to the trustee. The Commissioner asserts
a deficiency against the trustee, claiming that the deduction was improper but final deci-
sion of the Board is rendered against the contention. The Commissioner may secure an
adjustment with respect to the beneficiary. As the Commissioner, however, could have
asserted the deficiency against the trustee, although realizing it would fail, solely for tie
purpose of securing a determination with respect to the deduction which he could then
use under § 820 to pry open the beneficiary's closed year, it may be thought that sub-
section (b) (4) permits a procedure which was deemed improper under subsection (b) (3).
In ihe normal case, however, the periods of limitations with respect to trustee and benefi-
ciary expire at the same time, so that if it is too late to proceed directly against the
beneficiary, it will likewise be too late to proceed against the trustee solely t0 obtain
a determination. A safeguard is thus generally present in these cases which doeis not
obtain in subsection (b) (3) cases, or in the total failure to obtain a deduction situation,
for in the latter no such temporal limitation prevails with respect to the proceeding to
obtain a determination. The net result of subsection (b) (4) is that, with respect to the
additional deductions and inclusions specified in § 162(b) and (c), taxpayers and the
Commissioner may avail themselves of the longer period of time within which action is
permitted either with respect to the trustee's or beneficiary's tax liability, so that if the
trustee's return may still be affected by assessment or refund, the beneficiary's return
may likewise be affected. Suppose, however, that where the trustee took an additional
deduction for 1934 but the beneficiary did not return the income in his return for that
year, after the expiration of the period of limitations with respect to both trustee and
beneficiary for 1934, the Commissioner then, with malice aforethought, asserted a defi-
ciency for 1936 against the beneficiary on the ground that the 1934 distribution should be
included in gross income for that year. After the Commissioner loses, he claims an ad-
justment against the trustee under subsection (b) (4). No adjustment would be author-
ized as the beneficiary could here defend on the ground that the income was not taxable
in 1936 but, if taxable to him at all, properly taxable in 1934, and thus avoid maintaining
a position inconsistent with the deduction by the trustee.
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constitute related taxpayers, they are also affected by subsections (b) (1),
(2) and (3), and, in addition, they may fall under subsection (b) (5) in
an appropriate case. For example, if the beneficiary erroneously obtains
an allowance for depreciation and later, after the expiration of the period
of limitations on assessment against the beneficiary, a determination
requires that the trust be given the deduction for depreciation, an adjust-
ment is authorized by subsection (b) (2) with respect to the beneficiary-M
As Section 162(b) and (c) provide for the special deduction of amounts
which must in any event be included in the gross income of the trust and
as the complementary item for the beneficiary is an inclusion, these situa-
tions could not be subsumed under subsections (b) (1). (2) and (3) and
a special category was necessary.?O
Determination of Basis of Property JIfhere There Has Beeon Erroneous
Treatment of a Transaction Upon IThich Such Basis Depends.
Subsection (b) (5), which relates to basis problems, involves by far
the most difficult cases covered by Section 820. It provides an adjust-
ment where the determination establishes the basis of property, either
for gain or loss on its disposition or for depreciation or depletion, and
in respect of any transaction upon which such basis depends there was
an erroneous inclusion in or omission from gross income or an erroneous
recognition or nonrecognition of gain or loss. It thus deals with situa-
tions where either a stepped-up or reduced basis is obtained by reason of
a determination of basis predicated on proper treatment of the transac-
tion upon which the basis depends and prmpted by the assertion of a
position inconsistent with the earlier, and erroneous, treatment of that
transaction. The subsection carefully provides, however, that while the
person, either transferee or vendee, who acquired the property in that
transaction is affected by later inconsistent action either on his own part,
or that of his successors in title, or the Commissioner, such inconsistent
action does not affect the transferor or vendor in that transaction. Stated
158. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(h)-2, Example (2).
159. The language of subsection (b) (4) includes a specific reference to § 162(b) and
(c) of the REvExuE AcT OF 1938, so that each succeeding Revenue Act containing pro-
visions similar to that section will necessitate amendment of subsection fb) (4) to bring
it up-to-date. Rewriting of the subsection to eliminate such reference is a difficult task
The following phrasing may be helpful as a suggestion:
"(4) Allows or disallows to the fiduciary in computing the net income
of the trust or estate an additional deduction in respect of income included
in the gross income of the trust or estate and the correlative item has been
erroneously excluded or omitted from, or included in, as the case may be,
the gross income of the beneficiary, legatee, or heir; or requires the inclu-
sion in or the exclusion from the gross income of a beneficiary legatee, or
heir of an item of income and the correlative additional deduction has been
erroneously disallowed to or omitted by, or allowed to, as the case may te,
the fiduciary in computing the net income of the estate or trust; or . . ."
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differently, the error must have been either with respect to the taxpayer
as to whom the determination is made or with respect to a person who,
in the transaction erroneously treated, acquired title to the property in-
volved in the determination and from whom, mediately or immediately,
the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made derived
title, with a substituted basis, subsequent to the transaction. As a con-
sequence, the transferor and transferee of the erroneous transaction can-
not affect each other by later inconsistent conduct but can only subject
themselves to an adjustment; any successor in title whose basis depends
on the basis in the hands of the party to the erroneous transaction from
whom his title is derived may affect that party, with the proviso that
the chain of title is not traced through the transaction.
These situations can best be expressed by a series of examples :"0n
Suppose that in 1934 taxpayer A exchanged his Blackacre property, hav-
ing a $10,000 basis and a fair market value of $20,000, for the Whiteacre
property of taxpayer B, having a $15,000 basis and also a fair market
value of $20,000. In their returns for that year both taxpayers treated
the exchange as one in which gain or loss was not recognized, under
Section 112(b) (1). The period of limitations with respect to 1934
having expired:
(1) In 1939, taxpayer B claims that gain should have been recognized
on the exchange and that Blackacre has a $20,000 basis for depre-
ciation in his hands. His contention is sustained in a final Doard of
Tax Appeals decision. An adjustment is authorized with respect to
B's tax for 1934 as the basis for depreciation depends on the transac-
tion in 1934 and, as concerns that transaction, there was an erroneous
nonrecognition of gain with respect to the taxpayer, B, as to whom the
determination is made.:1 No adjustment is authorized as to A, however,
although there had also been an erroneous nonrecognition of gain in
his case, as A was not the taxpayer with respect to whom the deter-
mination is made, nor does the determination relate to property which
A acquired in the exchange, but rather to property which he transferred.
While B derived title to the property from A, the derivation was not
subsequent to the transaction but in the transaction itself. Likewise, if
B had for the first time claimed the higher basis on a sale to C in 1940,
adjustment would be authorized with respect to B but not to A.10
160. See the examples in Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-S.
161. The amount of the adjustment would be the full amount of the tax on the gain
from the exchange even though the taxpayer in claiming the higher basis for deprecia-
tion purposes did not, unlike the effect of a claim of higher basis on a sale, obtain in the
year to which the claim related the full effect of the higher basis.
162. If B had previously claimed a higher basis for the purpose of depreciation and
the Commissioner had obtained an adjustment, use of the higher basis by B on the sale
to C would not result in a second adjustment, since, as a result of the earlier adjustment
(see note 161, supra), there is neither an inconsistent position nor an erroneous non-
recognition of gain with respect to the transaction in which B acquired the property.
[Vol. 49: 719
SECTION 820 OF THE REVENUE ACT
(2) In 1940, A gives Whiteacre to D. Thereafter, in 1941 D sells
this property and claims a $20,000 basis, stating that as gain should
have been recognized on the 1934 transaction the basis in the hands of A,
his donor, was $20,000. This position is sustained by a final Board
decision. An adjustment is authorized with respect to A's tax for 1934,
as the basis in the hands of D depends on the 1934 transaction and with
respect to that transaction there was an erroneous nonrecognition of gain
to A, a person who acquired title to Whiteacre in the transaction, and
from whom immediately the taxpayer, D, derived title subsequent to the
transaction. But as subsection (b) (5) does not permit tracing of title
through the erroneously treated. transaction, there is no adjustment au-
thorized with respect to B because of D's action.
The words "or any person who acquired title to such property in such
transaction and from whom mediately or immediately the taxpayer derived
title subsequent to such transaction" thus perform tAo functions: (1) To-
gether with the words "any transaction upon which such basis depends"
they provide that the subsequent conduct of a donee or other taxpayer
with a substituted basis shall affect the predecessor in title who acquired
the property in the transaction; (2) They ensure that the subsequent
conduct of the transferee or vendee who acquired title in the transaction,
or of any of his successors in title, shall not affect the transferor of the
property in the transaction.' With respect to the first result, the section
has been criticized on the ground that where the donee of property takes
a position, to his advantage, inconsistent with the treatment accorded
the transaction in which his donor acquired the property, an adjustment
is authorized with respect to the donor under which he will be obliged
to pay a deficiency. While it is recognized that most donees would not
thus bite the hand that fed them, it is argued that an embittered donee
might well advance an advantageous claim although its success would
mean that the donor would be subjected to a deficiency. Such critics do
not deny the merit of subsection (b) (5) where the taxpayer who adopts
the inconsistent position is the one that is thereby subjected to the adjust-
ment. But it is obvious that if the subsection had not been extended to
the donee, a serious loophole would have been afforded. A taxpayer who
failed to recognize gain on the acquisifion of property and who later
desired to obtain the higher basis without an adjustment, could through
a gift permit his donee to assert the inconsistent position and thereby
163. The words "who acquired title to such property in such transaction" were added
to the Senate draft to accomplish this purpose. See the Sr.ATE-Mzr or TFME Horsn 11 %.-
AGERS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 58. It would seem that this addition makes the words
"subsequent to such transaction" superfluous as the derivation of title would necessarily
be subsequent. While the wording of the Senate draft prevented the tranferee's action
from affecting the transferor, it did not protect the transferor from adjustment w.here
the inconsistent position was taken by a transferee of the transferee.
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avoid the adjustment. Congress quite properly recognized that the ad-
vantage of tax stability afforded by this subsection was not to be sacri-
ficed because in a rare case a donor who misplaced his trust might come
to grief.
The second result of the words quoted in the preceding paragraph is
significant in exchanges under Section 112 (b). If partners A, B, C, and
D transfer their business to corporation X in return for an original issue
of its stock and all parties treat the exchange as tax-free, a subsequent
successful claim by A that the exchange was one in which gain should
have been recognized, as the stock each partner received was not sub-
stantially in proportion to his interest in the property, will result in an
adjustment with respect to A but not to B, C. D, or corporation X. A
contrary rule would have made the scope of adjustments too broad:
corporation X's depreciation account, for example, would be uncertain
until all of the partners had disposed of the stock by sale or death;
likewise, each partner would be insecure until all of the others had parted
with their stock." 4 The limited scope of the subsection in this regard
may be clearly seen in connection with the change in interpretation effected
by the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Hcndler.105
Previous to this decision, an assumption of indebtedness by the transferee
was not considered other property or money received as taxable boot
by the transferor under Section 112(d), so that tax was not paid by
transferors with respect to such assumptions of indebtedness. The
Hendler decision, however, held such a construction was erroneous, and
while it may be argued that the decision is restricted to the facts of im-
mediate payment by the transferee of a due debt, there are indications
that it may extend to all assumptions of indebtedness."'6 As a conse-
quence, transferors and transferees are now in a position to claim a
stepped-up basis to the extent of the gain that should have been recognized
because of the assumptions of indebtedness." 7 If the transferor claims
such basis, he will be subject to an adjustment under subsection (b) (5) ;
but if the transferee claims the higher basis, the transferor will not be
affected nor will the transferee itself be subject to an adjustment, as
164. See Report of the Senate Connittee on Finance, supra note 122, at 50. By adopt-
ing this rule, however, the subsection fails to cover other exchange, where adjustments
would seem proper, as where a parent corporation liquidates a subsidiary by acquiring its
assets and later successfully claims a stepped-up basis. No adjustment is authorized with
respect to the tax of the subsidiary, although as the parent corporation in practice
assumes the liability of the dissolved subsidiary, the adjustment would have been borne
by the parent.
165. 303 U. S. 564 (1938).
166. Walter F. Haass, 37 B. T. A. No. 141 (1938); Corpus Christi Terminal Com-
pany, 38 B. T. A. No. 119 (1938). Bickford's Inc. v. Helvering, 98 Fed. (2d) 568 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938), indicates payment in the year of the exchange is necessary.
167. Corpus Christi Terminal Company, 38 B.T. A. No. 119 (1938).
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under the circumstances there could be no erroneous nonrecognition of
gain to it at the time of the transfer.10
While it was apparently contemplated that subsection (b) (5) extended
only to cases where the transaction erroneously treated involved the
acquisition of property,' it literally covers certain cases where the trans-
action affecting the basis occurred after the acquisition of the property.
Suppose a corporate distribution has been erroneously taxed as a dividend.
Later, when the stockholder sells the stock, the Commissioner success-
fully contends that the basis of the stock should have been reduced under
Sections 115(d) and 113(b) (1) (d), Revenue Act of 1938, as the dis-
tribution was applicable in reduction of basis. An adjustment would
seem authorized, as there has been an erroneous inclusion in gross income
in respect of a transaction upon which the basis depends. But if the
stockholder had made a gift of the stock and the determination had been
with respect to the donee, no adjustment would be authorized, as the donor
did not acquire the stock in the erroneously treated transaction upon
which the basis depends. Consequently, the description of the predecessor
in title as a person "who acquired title to such property in such transac-
tion" is too narrow when applied to transactions affecting basis occurring
after the acquisition of the property. In the converse situation, where
the corporate distribution had been erroneously treated by the stockholder
as non-taxable, but he later successfully obtained the full basis by con-
tending that the distribution should have been taxed, no adjustment is
authorized with respect to the previous treatment of the corporate dis-
tribution; while with respect to the receipt of such distribution there
was an erroneous omission from gross income, it was not in respect of
any transaction upon which the basis depends, for correct treatment of
such distribution divorces the basis from the distribution.'" Thus, where
the previous transaction is erroneously treated as resulting in taxable
income and not as affecting basis, adjustment is authorized; where it
168. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-5, Examples (1)(a)(b)
and (c).
169. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 49, states that one
of the principles upon which § 820 is based is that "Disputes as to the basis of property
should not allow the taxpayer or the Commissioner to obtain an unfair tax advantage by
taking one position at the time of the acquisition of property and an inconsistent position
at the time of its disposition." The title of the Article in the Regulations dealing with
subsection (b) (5), Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, ArL 820(b)-5, is "Deter-
mination of basis of property in case of erroneous treatment of transaction relating to
acquisition thereof." Subsection (b) (5) includes all types of acquisition within its scope,
whether by purchase, exchange, receipt of property as payment for services rendered
[Example (3) under Art. 820(b)-5 of the Regulations]. etc.
170. The text thus strictly interprets the phrase "any tranaction upon which such
basis depends" as limited to transactions upon which the basis actually depends-trans-
actions which have the effect of increasing or reducing the basis-and as not including
transactions with respect to which there is a controversy over whether they do or do not
affect basis and it is finally determined that they do not.
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is erroneously treated as affecting basis, and not as resulting in taxable
income, adjustment is not authorized. As an adjustment would seem
desirable in the latter situation where the taxpayer claims the full basis,
subsection (b) (5) is also too narrowly drafted in this regard. It should
be noted, however, that while the first situation is similar to subsection
(b) (1)-an item is taxed once because of its inclusion in gross income
and again as part of the gain on the sale, the second is similar to sub-
section (b) (3)-an item is erroneously omitted from gross income and
later excluded from the gain on the sale,"'l so that to preserve the statute
of limitations in this case an adjustment would be proper only if tax
calculated upon the reduced basis had first been paid by the stockholder
and he then had claimed the full basis.
172
Transactions intermediate between the acquisition and disposition of
property may also serve to increase the basis. Suppose an expenditure
in connection with property is erroneously deducted from gross income
as an ordinary expense but on later sale of the property the taxpayer
171. While these situations are similar to subsections (b) (1) and (3), they are lint
covered by those subsections. Thus, although the item included in gross income wheni
the distribution is made is also deducted from the basis of the stock when it is sold, it is
not thereby again included in gross income as a separate item, but rather, as the basis is
reduced by the item, a larger profit on the sale results and it is this item.- gain on the
sale-that is included in gross income in the later year.
172. It may be noted, however, that subsection (b) (5) in respect to errors pertaining
to the acquisition of the property disregards the limitation effected in subsection (1) (3)
through the requirement that tax be paid. Thus, in a case where a taxpayer who had
acquired stock in a transaction erroneously treated as nonrecognizable later sells the
stock and uses the stepped-up basis, the Commissioner may utilize § 820 to open the stat-
ute of limitations with respect to the year of the earlier transaction simply by asserting
a deficiency, admittedly unfounded, urging the lower basis, thereby obtaining a deter-
mination and consequent adjustment. In objective outline the situation involves merely
the failure to include an item, here the gain on the earlier transaction, in gross income
and in this sense does not differ from the basic situation considered in subsection (b) (3).
The fact that but for the payment of tax requirement in subsection (b) (3) the Commis-
sioner could in any later year have used § 820 to pry open the statute of limitations ,
whereas in subsection (b) (5) he is forced to wait until the taxpayer claims the stepped-
up basis perhaps does not distinguish the two situations. It may be argued, however, that
as the basis accorded by the revenue acts to property for the purpose of gain or loss or
other disposition assumes proper tax treatment of the transaction upon which such basis
depends, departures from the statute of limitations are justified whenever a basis predi-
cated upon proper treatment has been obtained, but in fact such treatment of tile earlier
transaction had not been made. Thus, § 113(a) (6), in increasing the basis by the amount
of gain to the taxpayer "that was recognized upon such exchange under the law applica-
ble to the year in which the exchange was made," assumes that in fact such gain will be
taxed. If it is not taxed and the increased basis is later obtained, proper functioning of
the basis provisions requires the opening of the statute of limitations effected by subsec-
tion (b) (5). Similarly, subsection (b) (5) permits a taxpayer who failed to take a loss
on an exchange erroneously treated as nonrecognizable to open the statute of limitations,
after unsuccessful claim of the higher basis on later disposition, and obtain the deduction
for the loss, although the situation involves a "failure to obtain a deduction" case.
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successfully contends that it should have been capitalized and the basis
increased. In this situation no adjustment is authorized; although the
basis depends upon a transaction erroneously treated, the error is not
of the nature described in subsection (b) (5), an erroneous allowance
of a deduction not being specified. This case is similar to subsection
(b) (2), a deduction erroneously allowed has been allowed again as an
increase in basis, 73 and consequently should have been included in sub-
section (b) (5). The converse situation is also not covered by sub-
section (b) (5), so that if the expenditure had erroneously not been
deducted as ordinary expense, the taxpayer believing it to be a capital
expenditure, and later the Commissioner had successfully contended that
the basis was not increased, no adjustment is authorized; the basis, as
evidenced by the Commissioner's contention, does not depend upon the
transaction erroneously treated, and, moreover, an erroneous omission
of a deduction is not one of the described errors. But this situation is
similar to the case of a complete failure to obtain a deduction-a deduc-
tion erroneously omitted has not been allowed as an increase in basis,
and proper preservation of the statute of limitations would make adjust-
ment undesirable in this situation. 4
Subsection (b) (5) presents an interesting problem where the trans-
action erroneously treated concerns the disposition of only part of the
173. The case is not covered by subsection (b) (2) for the deduction erroneously
allowed is not again allowed as an independent deduction, but serves instead to reduce
or increase the amount of the item or deduction, gain or loss on the sale, that is incluled
in or deducted from gross income.
174. The treatment of depredation under subsection (b) (5) is governed by the rules
stated in the text. Where the taxpayer successfully claims a higher basis because of
erroneous nonrecognition of gain with respect to the transaction in which the property
was acquired, and the claim relates either to the basis for depreciation or for gain or
loss on a sale of the property, he would not obtain adjustment with respect to the inter-
vening years in which depredation wmas taken at the lower basis, as such depredation
is not a transaction upon which the basis later determined depends. While the incorrect
allowances for depreciation are traceable to the error for the year of acquisition, such
collateral effects of an error in other years are not corrected by § 820. See p. 743,
supra. In the case of the sale, as the adjustment of the basis for depreciation cannot be
less than the amount allowable in the intervening years [§ 113(b) (1) (B), P.-vr F. Acr
oF 1938], an amount greater than that previously allowed would be deducted from the
basis where the taxpayer claimed the stepped-up basis. The tax ayer, however, invited
these consequences by voluntarily asserting the inconsistent position. Similarly, if the
error were a failure to recognize a loss on the earlier exchange, and the Commissioner
with respect to the basis for sale successfully contended that it should be reduced because
of the loss that should have been recognized, no adjustment would be made for the inter-
vening years in which depredation had been taken on the higher basis. VWhere the Com-
missioner, in adjusting the basis for the sale, deducts for depreciation an amount greater
than that actually allowed in accordance with the provision that the adjustment for de-
predation cannot be less than the amount allowable, no adjustment is authorized by
§ 820 for the intervening years. Section 113(b) (1) (B), R'vExtN ACT oF 1938, reinforces
the period of limitations on annual deductions for depredation and the situation is thus
in effect similar to the complete failure to obtain a deduction, discussed supra, p. 757.
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property. Suppose that the taxpayer in 1932 acquired land at a cost
of $100,000. In 1934 he sold one-half of that land and computed his
gain on a cost basis of $50,000. In 1938 he sold the remaining portion
but claimed that as in 1934 it was the more valuable half, it should
have a $65,000 basis, computed on an allocation based upon the market
values in 1934 of the respective portions. If his contention is sustained,
subsection (b) (5) would permit the Commissioner to obtain an adjust-
ment with respect to 1934, as the basis for the 1938 sale depends upon
the transaction in 1934." Would the result be different if the property
originally acquired consisted of two distinct lots, and after an erroneous
allocation of basis for the purpose of computing gain on the sale of
one of them, the properly allocated basis is obtained on the sale of the
second lot? It would appear that no adjustment would be authorized;
the basis for the second lot does not depend on the sale of the first
inasmuch as the erroneous allocation in legal effect antedates the sale
of the first lot, being based on the respective market values at the time
the lots were acquired, while in the preceding example the allocation was
made at the time of, and because of, the sale of a portion of the previously
undivided lot.'76 This contention would be forcefully illustrated if depre-
175. But, as previously indicated, if a donee of a taxpayer had made the sale in 1938,
no adjustment would be authorized as the donor did not acquire title in the erroneously
treated transaction.
A similar situation is presented in the following example: the taxpayer in 1934 as-
signed his interest, which had a $100,000 cost basis, in oil and gas property in return
for a cash payment of $100,000 plus an additional $300,000 to be paid out of the oil and
gas, if and when produced. The transaction was treated as a sale of the taxpayer's. entire
interest in the property and no gain was recognized as the cash payment did not exceed
the basis. In 1936 the taxpayer received $100,000 out of the proceeds of the sale of oil
and gas and claimed that, as the original transaction really involved a sale of his interest
only to the extent of the cash payment, he had retained an economic interest in the oil
and gas in place to the extent of the additional consideration to be paid out of the pro-
ceeds of the oil and gas later sold, and therefore the basis should be allocated one-fourth
to the cash payment and three-fourths to the later payments. Accordingly, as respects
the 1936 payment, he was entitled to a deduction for depletion based on one-fourth of
the original basis. Cf. Fleming v. Commissioner, 82 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
If the taxpayer is successful, the Commissioner could claim that the basis for depletion
depends on the erroneously treated transaction of 1934 and that an adjustment is author-
ized under subsection (b) (5), in that as the portion then sold had a basis of 125,000,
there was an erroneous nonrecognition of $75,000 gain.
176. Suppose the taxpayer received a stock dividend in 1934 which he treated as non-
taxable under § 115(f), REENUE ACT OF 1934. He sold the stock dividend in 1935 and
computed his gain in accordance with the basis resulting from the allocation of the basis
of his original stock between it and the dividend stock. He then sold his original stoel,
in 1938 and claimed its entire cost as the basis, relying on Koshland v. Helvering, 298
U. S. 441 (1936). If he is successful, is an adjustment authorized with respect to the
sale of the dividend stock, assuming that it properly had a zero basis? Cf. Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937). Apparently not, as the decision that the dividend stock
has a zero basis establishes that the basis of the original stock does not depend upon
either the receipt or sale of the dividend stock. Next, suppose that the method of allo-
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ciable property were involved. The argument against adjustment is even
stronger where the property acquired consists of separate identical units,
so that the allocation is purely arithmetical. As such an interpretation,
however, would prevent an adjustment in that no transaction is present
upon which the erroneous allocation may be said to depend, and as the
sale is a transaction which is directly affected by the erroneous allocation,
it is possible that a contrary construction may be adopted. Where the
error is not with respect to the method or manner of allocation of a
correctly determined basis, as in the above situations, but involves a
mistake in the basis to be allocated, a different question is presented.
If the allocation qua allocation is correct but the erroneous original basis
has been used for allocation purposes on the first sale and the proper
original basis on the second, so that the second sale is inconsistent with
the treatment of the transaction involving the acquisition of the property,
while an adjustment is authorized under subsection (b) (5) with respect
to such transaction, 17 no adjustment would seem authorized with respect
to the first sale, even in the situation where allocation was necessary
because of such sale.1' s
Related Taxpayers.
The discussion so far has been largely in terms of a single taxpayer
and the Commissioner as the parties to a determination and an adjust-
ment. Section 820, however, is also applicable to "related taxpayers,"
so that the determination may involve one of the taxpayers in the rela-
tion and the adjustment involve the other. Our first inquiry here is as
to the relationships covered by Section 820.
(1) Relationships Subject to Section 820. Six relationships are speci-
fied in subsection 820(a) (3) : husband and wife, partners, decedent and
decedent's estate, and the trust relationships of grantor and fiduciary,
grantor and beneficiary, fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee or heir.'7"
cation is held to be proper in these cases, but that in applying it to the sale in 1935 the
taxpayer incorrectly allocated too much to the dividend stock. If he obtains the proper
allocation with respect to the original stock, is the Commissioner entitled to an adjust-
ment with respect to the dividend stock? Again, apparently not, for the reasons indi-
cated in the text.
177. The amount of the adjustment, being computed on the basis of complete cor-
rection of the error, would be equal to the entire amount of the gain or loss not recog-
nized on the transaction involving the acquisition of the property, and is not limited to
an aliquot portion determined by reference to the relation between the entire property
acquired and the portion later sold as to which the inconsistent position vwas asserted.
See Regulations 101, Appendix, T. 1). 4856, Art. 820(b)-5, Example (4).
178. See Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-5, Fample (4), .,hIch
takes this position in a situation where the property acquired consisted of identical shares
of stock.
179. The Senate draft included the additional relationships of assignor and assignee,
donor and donee, lessor and lessee, and claimants to ownership of the -ame property
or income.
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Congress thought that the nature of these relationships was such that in
most cases in which they were present it could safely be presumed that
the parties would act in unison and would present a single approach to
their tax problems. In most part it was merely reiterating for the pur-
poses of Section 820 a conclusion earlier reached with respect to the
tax consequences of other transactions. Thus, among other cases, losses
are now disallowed if they result from sales or exchanges of property
between members of a family, a grantor and a fiduciary, a fiduciary and
a beneficiary.' Again, a somewhat similar presumption is made in the
case of a trust which is revocable by the grantor in conjunction with a
person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of its
corpus or income.""' Moreover, as these relationships give rise to difficult
problems concerning the allocation of income to the proper party,
especially where the relationship is further complicated by assignments
between the parties, the ensuing tax litigation has frequently resulted in
the inequities sought to be eliminated by Section 820.182 The proper
background for this phase of Section 820 is therefore not that presented
by the problem of correctly taxing partner A's dividend income from
stock which he owns and partner B's rental income from his personally
owned property, but by the question of the proper apportionment of part-
nership income between partners A and B; nor is it the taxation of the
husband on income from property owned by his wife merely for the
purpose of treating the family as a unit, but rather the problem of properly
taxing insurance commissions assigned by the husband to the wife.83
Related taxpayers are specifically covered in the first four types of
cases specified in subsection (b). The fourth case, however, deals only
The inclusion of the fiduciary as a related taxpayer has been criticized on the ground
that an executor who closes an estate may years later become personally liable for an
adjustment under § 820 because of the provisions of Rpy. STAT. § 3467 (1875), as amend-
ed, making an executor personally liable for debts due to the United States by the estate
where he pays any other debt of the estate prior to satisfaction of the former debt. If
the adjustment, however, were authorized after the jrayment of the debts of the estate,
the amount of the adjustment would not be a debt due to the United States at the time
of such payment, so that personal liability may occur only where the adjustment wa
authorized prior to payment of the other debts of the estate.
180. Section 24(b), REVEUE ACT OF 1938.
181. Sections 166 and 167, REVENUE ACT OF 1938.
182. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, supra note 122, at 50; STATUrMNT
OF THE HoUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 58.
183. The erroneous transaction need not be one possible solely by reason of the exist-
ence of the relationship, but rather need only concern taxpayers who are related, so that
the erroneous treatment of an assignment of rents from partner A to partner B is cov-
ered, though neither the rents nor assignment were partnership matters. Regulations
101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(a)-4. See STATEMENT OF THE HousE MANAGFrtS,
op. cit. supra note 122, at 58, stating that assignor and assignee, donor and donee, lessor
and lessee, and claimants to ownership of the same property are eliminated as "inde-
pendent categories" of related taxpayers.
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with one of these relationships, that of fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee
or heir, as it is limited to the special situations considered in Section
162(b) and (c). Vhile subsection (b) (5) in effect extends to taxpayers
who are related by reason of a substituted basis, such as donor and donee,
transferor and transferee in Section 112(b) (4) and (5) transactions,
etc., it does not concern itself with related taxpayers as the term is
defined in Section 820."' For the purposes of subsection (b) the term
"taxpayer" refers to the individual with respect to whom the deter-
mination is made, the term "related taxpayer" refers to the individual
with respect to whom the adjustment is authorized. 1 '
(2) Time at Which Relationship Must Exist. The principal problem
in connection with related taxpayers concerns the time at which the rela-
tionship must exist. Subsection (a) (3), by including in the definition
of "related taxpayer" the words "in the taxable year with respect to
which the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, or dis-
allowance . . . was made" specifies one temporal requirement. The
Regulations interpret these words to mean "at some time during that
taxable year," so that it is not necessary for the relationship to exist
throughout the entire taxable year.180 This requirement in reality is little
more than a restatement of the existing situation, as it is the presence
184. Consequently, the omission of the donor-donee category from the definition of
related taxpayers (see notes 179 and 13, supra), does not prevent the application of
subsection (b) (5) to donor-donee cases.
185. Cf. subsection (a) (3), indicating that as to subsections (b) (1), (2), (3), and
(4) the "taxpayer" is the person with respect to whom the determination is made. While
the wording is not explicit, the term "taxpayer" in subsection (b) (5) is similarly used.
In subsections (c) and (d) the term "taxpayer" is used generally to refer to the tax-
payer with respect to whom the error was made. STATEMExT OF THE HOt'SE FANAGE S,
op. cit. supra note 122, at 59. The definition of "taxpayer" in subsection (a)(2) was
necessary to cure the problem created by § 901, which confines the term, when used in the
REvENUE ACT OF 1938, to persons subject to a tax imposed by that Act.
186. Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856. Art. 820(a)-4. The relationship of
decedent and decedent's estate presents an interesting problem in connection with this
requirement. If the error occurred in respect of a taxable year during which the de-
cedent was alive and the determination is with respect to the return filed by the decedent's
estate on behalf of the decedent, no problem of related taxpayer would seem to he pres-
ent, but rather the error and determination relate to the same taxpayer, the decedent.
If, however, the determination is with respect to the return of the decedent's estate,
related taxpayers are involved but obviously the relationship could not exist with respect
to the year as to which the error was made, so that no adjustment would he possible in
this case. If the error occurred with respect to the return of the decedent's estate and
the determination is with respect to the return filed by the decedent's estate on hihalf of
the decedent, the relationship existed at the requisite time. But if the reverse he the case.
the error occurring with respect to the return filed by the decedent's estate on behalf
of the decedent and the determination is with respect to the return of the decedent's
estate, it would seem that the case is no different from that where the error occurred
with respect to a return filed by the decedent during his lifetime and that the temporal
test of subsection (a) (3) is not satisfied.
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of the relationship which results in the doubt as to the choice of the
proper taxable person, which doubt, in turn, causes the error requiring
adjustment. 18 7 The second temporal requirement is specified in the latter
part of subsection (b) where it is provided that if the adjustment con-
stitutes a deficiency, the relationship must exist when the inconsistent
position is maintained. In such a situation it is the taxpayer who has
maintained the inconsistent position, and as the inclusion of the related
taxpayer categories rests on the presumption that with respect to the
original error and the later inconsistent treatment the two taxpayers will
act in unison, it follows that the requirement of the existence of the
relationship at the later time is essential. If the relationship had ter-
minated prior to the taking of the inconsistent position, no adjustment
is authorized although the result of the successful maintenance of the
inconsistent position is that both taxpayers obtain a deduction, for ex-
ample, to which only one is entitled.' 8 Where, however, the inconsistent
position is taken by the Commissioner, so that the adjustment would
constitute an overpayment, the basis for the adjustment is not the pre-
sumption of unison but the fact that the Commissioner by his incon-
sistency has in effect taxed two persons on the same income, or disallowed
to each a deduction which one properly should have. In this situation,
the adjustment should be made even though the relationship has been
terminated;189 Section 820 so provides by limiting the requirement of
continuation of relationship to cases where the adjustment constitutes
a deficiency. In those cases, the time at which the relationship must exist
187. As explained previously, supra note 157, subsection (b) (4) disregards the limita-
tion of payment in an "income never included" situation, and permits adjustment in a
"deduction never allowed" situation. Inasmuch as the period of limitations will normally
expire at the same time as respects both trustee and beneficiary, an adequate safeguard
is present. It is arguable that the same situation exists with respect to other classes of
related taxpayers, so that § 820 is thus too narrowly drafted, both because in subsection
(b) (3) it applies the limitation of payment to related taxpayers, and it also fails to
cover a "deduction never allowed" with respect to related taxpayers.
188. The STATEMENT OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS, op. cit. supra note 122, at 58, in lin-
iting the requirement to cases where the relationship is "terminable" overlook's the fact
that all of the relationships specified in subsection (a) (3) are terminable, so that no
limitation.actually results from such requirement. The Regulations are not so qualified.
Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856, Art. 820(b)-8.
Section 820 would seem operative in the rare case where the taxpayers stood in one
relationship in the earlier year, as that of partners, and in a different relationship, as
that of husband and wife, at the time of the inconsistent position, inasmuch as either
relationship is presumed under subsectioh (a) (3) to result in unity of action. Query,
if in the case of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship, the fiduciary in the earlier year
had been replaced by a different fiduciary, would an adjustment be authorized under the
wording of subsection (a) (3) ?
189. For the same reasons, the careful selection of the categories covered by the
term "related taxpayer" likewise seems excessively cautious where the Commissioner
has maintained the inconsistent position, fbr, regardless of the nature of their relation-
ship, an adjustment should be made.
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is described as follows: if the inconsistent position is asserted in a return,
claim for refund, or petition (or amended petition) to the Board of Tax
Appeals, the requisite date is the date of filing of the document in which
the position was asserted, or, if asserted in more than one such document,
the date of filing of the document in which it was first asserted.1'O While
these documents are the typical documents in which the inconsistent
position would be maintained, it is possible that it may be otherwise main-
tained, as where a closing agreement allows the taxpayer a deduction not
claimed in any of the above three documents. Consequently, if the in-
consistent position is not so maintained, the requisite relationship must
exist on the date of the determination. Section 820, finally, affords an
additional safeguard where the related taxpayers become unfriendly, in
that the determination with respect to one of the taxpayers is not con-
clusive as to the error with respect to the other. Under subsection (c)
the Commissioner, unless a waiver is obtained, must proceed by way of
notice of deficiency against the other taxpayer in order to establish the
error and obtain the amount of the adjustment, so that the latter is
afforded a judicial hearing in which he can assert any defenses at hand,
regardless of the prior determination.1 '
Effect of Section 820 Upon Judicial Doctrines Previously Applied.
There remains for consideration the effect of Section 820 upon the
doctrines applied by'the courts in this field prior to the enactment of
Section 820.19 Three broad questions may be asked: (1) Does Section
820 displace the judicial solution in those situations described in sub-
sections (b) (1)-(5) ; (2) Does it prevent application of the judicial
solution in those cases intentionally excluded by Congress from a general
class to which Section 820 applies; (3) Does it prevent application of
the judicial solution to those classes of cases to which Section 820 does
not purport to apply? The following example illustrates the first ques-
190. The document must relate to the year with respect to which the determination
is made, so that an inconsistent position taken in a return for an earlier year is not to
be considered in fixing the time at which the relationship must still be in e-dstence.
191. Suppose partner A took a deduction for 1935 to which he was properly entitled.
Partner B claims the deduction in a refund claim and the Commissioner erroneously
allows the deduction. He then seeks to obtain an adjustment with respect to A under
subsection (b) (2), claiming that A erroneously took the deduction. A contests the ad-
justment and is successful in the Board of Tax Appeals. The Commissioner may then
seek an adjustment with respect to B, likewise under subsection (b) (2). B may also
contest the adjustment, and while it is probable that the decision in A'.s case .ill be per-
suasive, it is not binding and the court or Board may decide that B is entitled to the
deduction. In that event, the Commissioner can proceed no further, as res judicata
would bar another attempt at adjustment with respect to B. Similarly, if A had in the
first instance obtained a court decision, the Commissioner could not proceed under § 820
after B had successfully defeated the adjustment.
192. See 48 YA L. J. 509, 511 et seq.
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tion: Suppose a taxpayer had erroneously failed to include an item in
gross income for 1936, had erroneously included it in gross income for
1938 and had then brought suit for refund. Assume that the facts were
such that a court would hold prior to Section 820 under established
principles that the taxpayer was estopped from claiming that the item
belonged in the barred year, so that his suit must fail.13 After the
enactment of Section 820, should the court follow the precedents and
estop the taxpayer or should it permit recovery of the refund on the
ground that Section 820 was intended by Congress to provide an exclu-
sive solution for this case, as it falls under Section 820(b) (3)? By its
terms Section 820 applies only after a determination of the specified type
has been made; it does not prescribe any rules as to when or in what
cases such a determination shall be reached. It may be argued, therefore,
that this section does not require a departure from any rules governing
the determination established prior to its enactment. Accordingly, if the
precedents require an estoppel, the court should deny the refund in the
above example. Under this argument, Section 820 would apply only
where the precedents would not justify an estoppel, i.e., where the court
allowed the refund and thus brought about a determination under sub-
section (b) (3). This argument rests upon too narrow a conception of
the purpose of Section 820. It is evident from the Committee Reports
that Congress was motivated by three considerations: (1) the judicial
doctrines offered an inadequate solution because of their uncertainty and
one-sidedness; (2) a uniform, systematic statutory solution was desirable
in those situations which lent themselves to such treatment; (3) for
reasons previously described, the solution to be made uniform by the
section in those situations was not to be that offered by the judicial
doctrines but a procedure which enabled the party, either Commissioner
or taxpayer, to shift his position if he so desired and thereby reach the
correct result under the tax law, with the proviso that a compensatory
adjustment was to be made. 9 The Congressional purpose, therefore,
can be fully executed only if the statutory solution thus adopted is per-
mitted to operate exclusively in the classes of cases designated by Congress
in subsections (b) (1)-(5) as permitting such uniform treatment. It
necessarily follows from this view of Section 820 that it is a Congressional
declaration that the judicial doctrines previously evolved are not to be
applied by the court in those situations described in subsections (b) (1)-
(5). In other words, if strict application of the revenue acts would
produce a determination of the type enumerated in subsection (b) (1)-
(5), the statutory law shall be applied. Moreover, a judicial estoppel is
a matter of last resort. It will not be created where the aggrieved party
193. Cf. 5 PAUL AND MERTEws, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1938 Cun.
Supp.) §§53.14c, 53.17.
194. See supra, p. 737 ct seq.
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can otherwise be saved from unjust damage. Section 820 provides orderly
and adequate relief in the cases which it covers. Consequently, as to those
cases, the need for the estoppel doctrine is removed. In the foregoing
example, therefore, the refund should be allowed by the court inasmuch
as upon allowance, there would be a determination within the category
described in subsection (b) (3).'"
The second of the questions above would be present if in the example
given the taxpayer had correctly omitted the item from gross income
for 1938 but the Commissioner had asserted a deficiency for that year.
Assume, again, that the facts were such that a court would allow the
deficiency by estopping the taxpayer from asserting that the item belonged
in gross income for 1936.9° Should the court still allow the deficiency
or should it deny the deficiency on the ground that, as Congress had
intentionally excluded from subsection (b) (3) a case where tax was not
paid, it intended thereby that a strict application of the revenue acts
should be made in such a case? It is believed, however, that these cases
were excluded because, for the reasons stated above,1"- Congress realized
they did not lend themselves to this particular systematic statutory solu-
tion. The solution in each case, therefore, was left to depend as formerly
upon its particular facts. Accordingly, the established judicial doctrines
are here left unaffected by Section 8 20 .1S For like reasons, and even
more unhesitatingly, the same answer must be given to the third question
above stated.39
CoNCLUSION
Obviously no attempt should be made to summarize the foregoing dis-
cussion in the ordinary sense. It is, however, in order to state very gener-
ally the conclusions toward which our exposition tends. First we desire
to reiterate The hope and belief that the presence of Section 820 in the
internal revenue laws will have the effect of tranquillizing most con-
195. While this view would require the court not to apply the judicial doctrines other-
wise applicable where it found that a strict application of the revenue acts would result
in a determination under subsections (b) (1)-(5), it does not necessitate the court's deter-
mining whether all the conditions to the operation of § 820, e.g., maintenance of an incon-
sistent position, prevention of correction of error, have been satisfied.
196. Cf. 5 PAU. AND MERTENS, 10c. cit. supra note 193; Comment (1938) 52 HAav.
L. Rxv. 300. 306.
197. See supra, p. 755 et seq.
198. Similar considerations apply to cases involving related taxpayers not enumerated
in subsection (a) (3), the "failure to obtain a deduction' situation, and determinations in
which an adjustment would be made were it not for the limitations of subsection (f).
See, however, Comment (1938) 52 Hav. L. REv. 300, 305.
199. Cases involving interaction of the estate tax and the income tax [see Bull V.
United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935)], and cases involving disputes concerning a single
taxpayer where only one year is in question [see Leis v. Reynolds. 284 U. S. 281
(1932)] are emmples of the situations included in this category. See Comment (1933)
52 HARv. L. REv. 300.
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troversies about double allowance of deductions, double inclusion of
items of gross income, and such related matters as fall within the scope
of the legislation. So far as difficult and doubtful cases which may come
within the field of Section 820 necessitate litigation, it is the part of
frankness to admit that formidable problems of interpretative application
may arise. Some of these'problems, omitted from or inadequately guarded
against by the original terms of the enactment, should be met by clarifying
and supplementing amendatory action. The section deserves fair trial
and for the purpose of testing its utility the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
the Department of Justice, and to such extent as is practicable private
practitioners as well, should collect and collate statistics and practical
experience.
APPENDIX
"Section 820 !MITIGATION OF EFFECT OF LImiTATION AND OTHER PROVISIONS 1% INCOMI:
TAX CASES.
(a) Definitions.-For the purpose of this section-
(1) Determination.-The term 'determination under the income tax laws' means-
(A) A closing agreement made under section 606 of the Revenue Act of
1928, as amended;2
(B) A decision by the Board of Tax Appeals or a judgment, decree, or other
order by any court of competent jurisdiction, which has become final; or
(C) A final disposition by the Commissioner of a claim for refund. For the pur-
poses of this section a claim for refund shall be deemed finally disposed
of by the Commissioner-
(i) as to items with respect to which the claim was allowed, upon
the date of allowance of refund or credit or upon the date of
mailing notice of disallowance (by reason of offsetting items)
of the claim for refund, and
(ii) as to items with respect to which the claim was disallowed,
in whole or in part, or as to items applied by the Commissioner
in reduction of the refund or credit, upon expiration of the time
for instituting suit with respect thereto (unless suit is in.si-
tuted prior to the expiration of such time).
Such term shall not include any such agreement made, or decision, judgment,
decree, or order which has become final, or claim for refund finally disposed of,
prior to ninety days after the date of the enactment of this Act
(2) Taxpayer.-Notwithstanding the provisions of section 901," the term 'taxpayer'
means any person subject to a tax under the applicable Revenue Act.
1. Now INT. REv. CODE § 3801.
2. Now INT. Rav. CODE § 3760.
3. INT. REv. CODE § 3801 reads: "prior to August 27, 1938."
4. Now INT. Ray. CODE § 3797.
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(3) Related Taxpayer.The term 'related taxpayer" means a taxpayer who, with
the taxpayer with respect to whom a determination specified in subsection
(b) (1), (2), (3), or (4) is made, stood, in the taxable year with respect
to which the erroneous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, or disallow-
ance therein referred to was made, in one of the following relationships: (A)
husband and wife; (B) grantor and fiduciary; (C) grantor and beneficiary;
(D) fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee, or heir; (E) decedent and decedent's
estate; or (F) partner.
(b) Circumstances of Adjustment.-When a determination under the incumn tax
laws-
(1) Requires the inclusion in gross income of an item which was erroneously
included in the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year
or in the gross income of a related taxpayer; or
(2) Allows a deduction or credit which was erroneously allowed to the
taxpayer for another taxable year or to a related taxpayer; or
(3) Requires the exclusion from gross income of an item with reslpect tWj
which tax was paid and which was erroneously excluded or omitted from
the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or from the
gross income of a related taxpayer; or
(4) Allows or disallows any of the additional deductions allow,,able in com-
puting the net income of estates or trusts, or requires or denies any of
the inclusions in the computation of net income of beneficiaries, heirs, or
legatees, specified in section 162 (b) and (c) of this Act," and ctrres-
ponding sections of prior revenue Acts, and the correlative inclui,n or
deduction, as the case may be, has been erroneously excluded, omitted,
or included, or disallowed, omitted, or allowed, as the case may be, in
respect of the related taxpayer; or
(5) Determines the basis of property for depletion, exhaustion, wear and
tear, or obsolescence, or for gain or loss on a sale or exclange, and in
respect of any transaction upon which such basis depends there %%as an
erroneous inclusion in or omission from the gross income of, or an
erroneous recognition or nonrecognition of gain or loss to, the taxvpayer
or any person who acquired title to such property in such transaction
and from whom mediately or immediately the taxpayer derived title
subsequent to such transaction-
and, on the date the determination becomes final, correction of the effect of
the error is prevented by the operation (whether before, on, or afttr the date
of enactment of this Actf) of any provision of the internal-revenue laws other
than this section and other than section 3229 of the Revised Statutes, as amend-
ed 7 (relating to compromises), then the effect of the error shall be crreztcd
by an adjustment made under this section. Such adjustment shall Ue made
only if there is adopted in the determination a position maintained by the Com-
missioner (in case the amount of the adjustment would be refunded or credit-
ed in the same manner as an overpayment under subsection (c)) or l y the
taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made (in case the amuint
of the adjustment would be assessed and collected in the same manner as a
deficiency under subsection (c)), which position is inconsistent with the erro-
neous inclusion, exclusion, omission, allowance, disallovance, recognition, or
5. Now § 162(b) and (c) of Chapter 1.
6. INT. REv. CODE § 3801 reads: "before, on, or after May 23, 193S."
7. Now INT. REV. CODE § 3761.
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nonrecognition, as the case may be. In case the amount of the adjustment
would be assessed and collected in the same manner as a deficiency, the ad-
justment shall not be made with respect to a related taxpayer unless he stands
in such relationship to the taxpayer at the time the latter first maintains the
inconsistent position in a return, claim for refund, or petition (or amended
petition) to the Board of Tax Appeals for the taxable year with respect to
which the determination is made, or if such position is not so maintained, then
at the time of the determination.
(c) Method of Adjustment.-The adjustment authorized in subsection (b) shall be
made by assessing and collecting, or refunding or crediting, the amount there-
of, to be ascertained as provided in subsection (d), in the same manner as if it
were a deficiency determined by the Commissioner with respect to the tax-
payer as to whom the error was made or an overpayment claimed by such
taxpayer, as the case may be, for the taxable year with respect to which the
error was made, and as if on the date of the determination specified in sub-
section (b) one year remained before the expiration of the periods of limita-
tion upon assessment or filing claim for refund for such taxable year.
(d) Ascertainment of Amount of Adjustment.-In computing the amount of an
adjustment under this section there shall first be ascertained the tax previously
determined for the taxable year with respect to which the error was made.
The amount of the tax previously determined shall be (1) the tax shown by
the taxpayer, with respect to whom the error was made, upon his return for
such taxable year, increased by the amounts previously assessed (or collected
without assessment) as deficiencies, and decreased by the amounts previously
abated, credited, refunded, or otherwise repaid in respect of such tax; or (2) if
no amount was shown as the tax by such taxpayer upon his return, or if no
return was made by such taxpayer, then the amounts previously assessed (or
collected without assessment) as deficiencies, but such amounts previously
assessed, or collected without assessment, shall be decreased by the amounts
previously abated, credited, refunded, or otherwise repaid in respect of such
tax. There shall then be ascertained the increase or decrease in the tax pre-
viously determined which results solely from the correct exclusion, inclusion,
allowance, disallowance, recognition, or nonrecognition, of the item, inclusion,
deduction, credit, gain, or loss, which was the subject of the error. The
amount so ascertained (together with any amounts wrongfully collected, as
additions to the tax or interest, as a result of such error) shall be the amount
of the adjustment under this section.
(e) Adjustment Unaffected by Other Items, Etc.-The amount to be assessed and
collected in the same manner as a deficiency, or to be refunded or credited in
the same manner as an overpayment, under this section, shall not be dimin-
ished by any credit or set-off based upon any item, inclusion, deduction, credit,
exemption, gain, or loss other than the one which was the subject of the error.
Such amount, if paid, shall not be recovered by a claim or suit for refund or
suit for erroneous refund based upon any item, inclusion, deduction, credit,
exemption, gain, or loss other than the one which was the subject of the error.
(f) No Adjustment for Years Prior to 1932.-No adjustment shall be made under
this section in respect of any taxable year beginning prior to January 1, 1932."
